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NOTES
STANDING AND INJUNCTIONS: THE DEMISE OF
PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND OTHER EFFECTS
OF LYONS
Prior to the Warren Court era, use of injunctions by federal courts was considered a
last resort or an "extraordinary remedy."' Beginning with the Supreme Court's lanchnark
1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 2 however, the injunction was given "special
prominence" and became one of the Court's most important tools in effecting societal
changes in the area of desegregation. 3 Following Brown, federal court injunctive power
became more widely used.' This development led to a proliferation of civil rights cases
filed uncle' . section 1983, 5 in which federal courts became increasingly sympathetic to
plaintiffs who filed suit in order to enjoin government policy." These cases in which
federal courts have used their injunctive power against state government have been called
"public law litigation" or "institutional litigation" by many commentators because of the
unique nature of the remedies ordered in such cases.' These decisions are unique because
they tend to involve affirmative administrative changes in, and continuing judicial super-
vision of', government institutions." The proliferation of public law litigation and the
intrusive nature of the injunctions that have been issued in such cases have raised
questions concerning the appropriateness and legitimacy of such federal court activity. 9
0. Piss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, 1-4 (1978) !hereinafter cited as P. Fiss].
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (where the
Supreme Court later affirmed lower court injunctive orders in the same case).
0, riss, supra note 1, at 4.
4 Id .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Sup!). V 1981). See Howard, The Slates and the Supreme Court. 31
CATH. U. L. REV. 375, 380 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Howard]; Aldisert,judicia/ Expansion of Federal
Jurisdiction: tl Federal Court Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW
& ORD. 557, 561 (1973).
See Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE
L. J. 635, 665 (1982) [hereinafter cited is Fletcher].
See, e.g., Chayes, The Supreme Court 198 1 Term — Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Chayes, 1982]; Chayes,The Role of theludge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. I,. Kiw. 1281, 1302 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Chayes, 1976];
Fletcher, supra note 6, at 635; Mishkin, Federal Courts as Stale Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 949,
949 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin]. The term public law litigation, as it will be used in this note,
will reler to federal court litigation in which the plaintiff has brought Stilt seeking to change the
policies and administration of a branch of local government. Such suits result in the federal court
attempting to remedy the violation of Sim utory or constitutional law by ordering affirmative changes
in the administration of the particular branch of government or institution. For the purposes of this
note, the focus of inquiry will he on public law litigation that primarily involves a branch of state or
local government.
See, e.g., Howard, supra note 5, at 426; Mishkin, supra note 7, at 649.
9 See, e.g., I). HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOC/AL POLICY, 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as D.
HoRowrrz]; Fletcher, supra note 6, at 635; Frog, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
715, 716 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Frog]; Glazer, Towards an Imperial judiciary, 41 PUB. INTEREST
104, 106-08 (Fall 1975) [hereinafter cited as Glazer]; Howard, supra note 5, at 426; Mishkin, supra
note 7, at 949; Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 SEAN, 1.. Rev.
661, 661 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Nagel].
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Indeed, the proliferation of such litigation has led to a heated debate among commen-
tators,'" Some critics have suggested that the decrees issued in these cases constitute an
illegitimate use of federal power that usurps the democratic process," while others have
characterized the federal court activity as a necessary means of enforcing newly recog-
nized substantive rights.'
Since 1971," the Supreme Court has responded to the Hood of public law litigation
the Court invited in its earlier decisions by curtailing i he availability of such suits." One
way the Court has limited public law litigation has been by applying the entry require-
ments of standing in a manner that limits the circumstances in which a plaintiff may gain
access to the courts for the purposes of airing a grievance with government policy,'
Another way that the Court has limited public law litigation is by requiring that federal
courts give deference, in the Ha111C or federalism, to executive and legislative branches of
state government before issuing an injunction that intrudes into local decision-making
processes.'" The Court's restrictive trend has brought forth a considerable amount of
criticism from both commentators and members of the Court.'" This criticism indicates
Fin' comments on the use of federal equitable power in specific areas, see, e.g., W.	 HE
RISE or GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974) (critical look at use of federal equitable power in reapportion-
ment cases); L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE
ScutooLs, 13 (1976) (critical look at court ordered busing as a remedy); LaRne,justiciability and Mental
Health, 32 WASH. gc LEE.
 L. REV. 347 (1975) (critical look at court supervision of mental institutions),
'" Compare authorities cited, supra note 9 with Chayes, 1982, supra note 7, at 4; Chayes, 1976,
supra note 7, at 1281; Eisenberg & Yeazell,l'he Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HA tiv. I.. REV, 465 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Eisenberg & Yeazell]; Goldstein, A Swann Song far
Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HAIL. C.R.-C.1... L REV. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Goldsreinj: Johnson, The Role of Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation. 32 ALA. L. REV. 271 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Johnson]; Rudenstine, Institutional Injunctions, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 611 (1983);
Weinberg, The New judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1191 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Weinberg]. See also judicially Managed Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 267 (1981) (a symposium
consisting of a series of articles on public law litigation).
" See, e.g., Fletcher,.supra note 6, at 635; Frug, supra note 9, at 735; Glazer,,supra note 9, at 118;
Howard, supra note 5, at 426.
' 2 See, e.g., Eisenberg	 Yeazell, supra note 10, at 516.
" In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Younger u. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the
Court invoked the doctrine of "Our Federalism" to restrain a federal court from enjoining a state
court criminal proceedings. Id. al 44. 'Ile doctrine of federalism enunciated in that decision planted
the seeds of federalism that would later be utilized to restrain federal court injunctive power in other
public law litigation cases. See infra notes 149-69 and accompanying test,
14
 For consideration of various ways in which the ORM has Mailed federal CoorI litigation
under section 1983, see generally Howard, .cupra note 5; Developments in the Law — Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARI.% L. REV. 1133 (1977) !hereinafter cited as Developments — Section 1983). As the
above commentaries demonstrate, the Supreme Court has limited section 1983 actions in various
ways (i.e. abstention, scope of liability, exhaustion of rentedies). This note, however, is principally
concerned with the limitations on public law litigation arising from the O'Shea-Rizzo-Lyons line of
cases, regarding standing and the prerequisites of injunctive relief.
15 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 179-80 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21
(1974). See also City of Los Angeles v. 1...yon.s, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1667 (1983).
' 6 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976).
See, e.g., supra note 10 and articles cited therein. See also juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 346
(1977) (Brennan, j., dissenting).
For Iwo rather cynical characterizations of the Supreme Court's trend, see Fiss, Dombrowski, 86
VALE 1103, 1159-60 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fiss, Dombrowski] (suggesting that the applica-
tion of federalism to limit federal equity power is founded in "a desire to insulate the status quo");
Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1235 (suggesting that the Court's use of federalism "may be perceived as
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that the Court's restrictive trend has serious implications for the federal judicial system.
One of the most recent public law litigation cases to come before the Supreme Court
was City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.' In Lyons, a plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief
in a federal district court against the city police department for injuries he allegedly
sustained from a "chokehold" applied to him by Los Angeles police officers after he had
been stopped for a minor vehicle code violation."' In the process of the lower court
proceedings, the plaintiff's damages claim was "severed" from his claim for injunctive
relief. 2° Ruling only on the injunctive claim, the lower court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion that prohibited the use of chokeholds by city police officers.'' After the court of
appeals affirmed the district court injunctive order, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. 22 The Supreme Court reasoned
that for purposes of establishing standing to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff's allegation
of past injury would not be enough to meet the case or controversy requirement of Article
The Court stated that although the plaintiff had a pending damages claim that
appeared to meet the standing requirements, the plaintiff lacked standing to seek an
injunction because he had failed to show a likelihood of future injury. 24 In addition, the
Court recognized the need for a proper balance between state and federal authority,
stating that granting injunctions which regulate the conduct of local law enforcement
authorities was not the role of a federal court.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Lyons is significant because of the restrictive analysis
used by the Court. Shortly after Lyons was decided, lower federal courts began denying
injunctions against state government on the basis of the reasoning in the Lyons opinion. 25
In those cases, plaintiffs have made a clear showing of past injury and sought damages
a way to accomplish procedurally a counterrevolution in race relations impossible to launch substan-
tively").
103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983). For a thorough critique of the Lyons decision, see Fallon, Of justiciabil-
ity, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.C. L. Rev. I (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Fallon]. See also Standing to Seek Equitable Relief, 97 HARV. L. REV. 215 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Standing to Seek Equitable Relief].
' 9 Id. at 1663.
Id. at 1667 n.6,
21 Id. at 1664.
Id. at 1667.
a See id. at 1665.
" Id. at 1667.
25 Id. at 1670-71.
" See, e.g., Curtis v. City of New Haven, 726 F.2d 65, 65 (2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs denied
injunction against police use of mace); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 481 (9th Cir. 1983)
(illegal and resident aliens denied injunction against city police department for allegedly unconstitu-
tional arrests under federal immigration laws); Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1447 (5th Cir.
1984) (plaintiff denied injunction against a constables' fee system that allegedly deprived plaintiff of
an objective probable cause determination); Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 927 (4th Cir. 1983)
(plaintiff, a prisoner, lacked standing to seek an injunction against County Sheriff for various alleged
violations of constitutional rights); Smith v. Montgomery County, Maryland, 573 F. Supp. 604 (1).
Md. 1983) (woman denied injunctive relief against County Police for allegedly unconstitutional strip
searches); McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1423 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (plaintiff denied
injunction against police department's use of chokehold, the use of which had previously caused the
death of plaintiff's husband); Trotter v. Klincar, 566 F. Supp. 1059, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (plaintiff
denied injunction against prisoner parole board for alleged deprivation of civil rights); Stefaniak v.
State of Michigan, 564 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (plaintiffs denied injunctive relief
against state police department for alleged police misconduct).
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and injunctive relief against a branch of local government." Despite allegations of past
injury which afforded the plaintiffs standing to seek damages, the lower courts have
denied standing to seek injunctive relief on the grounds that Lyons requires a plaintiff to
show a likelihood of future injury in order to have standing to bring an injunctive claim."
The standing inquiry established by Lyons requires a plaintiff to meet case or con-
troversy requirements for each claim of relief sought. Such an inquiry is, indeed, a new
approach to the question of standing. In previous standing cases, the Supreme Court. has
traditionally required that a court consider only whether a plaintiff' is entitled to some
form of relief that will give the plaintiff a "personal stake in the outcome" of his suit.'" Lt
other words, if the plaintiff could show that he was entitled to a damages remedy or an
equitable remedy, he was deemed to have met the standing requirements for the pur-
poses of having his entire complaint heard by the federal court." Once the plaintiff had
demonstrated that either remedy was available, a sufficient case or controversy existed lOr
the federal court to take jurisdiction over the case.'" in contrast to this traditional inquiry,
the new inquiry requires that the plaintiff show a sufficient case or controversy for each
claim of relief." Traditionally, the issue whether a plaintiff is entitled to an injunction has
been reserved to the end of a law suit after all of the evidence has been presented and the
trial court hits had an opportunity to determine the need for such relief in light of all the
facts proven during the trial." The decision whether a plaintiff was entitled to an
injunction rested within the sole discret ion of' he trial judge." The new standing inquiry,
" See cases cited supra note 26.
"' See, e.g., Curtis v. City of New Haven, 726 F.2d 65, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1984); Gonzales v. City of
Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 481 (9th Cir. 1983); 111cQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Stipp. 1401, 1421.23
(N.D. Ca. 1983).
2" See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
The Court has stated that a plaintiff must allege "a distinct and palpable injury to himself ...
that is likely' to be redressed if the requested relief is granted." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood. 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Once a plaintiff has alleged
such an injury, the Article 111 requirements are deemed to have met. id. at 115. The Court has never
before inquired whether the plaintiff has a "personal stake" in each claim of relief the plaintiff seeks.
31 See 103‘S. Cr. at 1681 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See, e.g.. Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1446-47 (5th Cir. 1984); Twyman v. Rockville
Housing Authority, 99 F.R.D. 314, 319 (D. Md. 1983); Trotter v. Klincar, 566 F. Stipp. 1059, 1063
(N. D. III. 1983).
" See generally ittrRtGE- r F.c. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2942 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as WRIGHT & NiILLERI (indicating that the decision to grant injunctive relief is generally a
discretionary decision made by the trial court). As Wright and Miller have stated:
Perhaps the most significant single component in the judicial decision whether to
exercise equity jurisdiction and grant permanent injunctive relief is the court's discre-
tion.... Wu most cases the determination whether to issue an injunction involves :I
balancing of the interests of the parties who might be affected by the court's deci-
sion.... IBlecause of its discretionary character, an injunction decree typically is
drafied in flexible terms, can be molded to meet the needs of each case, and may be
modified if circumstances change„ . .
It 365-68.
'4 See id. Before a party is entitled to injunctive relief, the court must find "that the plaintiff is
being threatened by some injury fOr which he has no adequate remedy at law." Id. at 368-69.
Although this requirement is similar to the allegation of future injury that is necessary' to afford a
person standing under Lyons, it has been pointed our that there is a danger involved in foreclosing
injunctive relief before the court can gather information about the defendant's misconduct. See City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. at 1680 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Fallon, supra note 18, at
7.
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however, effectively constitutionalizes this issue of appropriate remedy by requiring, as a
mandate of Article Ill, that the plaintiff allege a likelihood of future injury during the
pleadings stage of the case."5
The Lyons standing inquiry has been an effective obstacle to plaimilk who have
sought injunctive relief against governmental defendants."" As formulated by the Court,
however, the inquiry is constitutionally mandated as a requirement of Article 111." The
analysis of Lyons is, therefore, theoretically applicable to cases in which a non-govern-
mental defendant is involved. if a plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief against a
private defendant such as an individual or a corporation, the implication is that the
plaintiff will have to meet standing requirements for each claim of relief because Article
Ill is applicable to all federal court cases, not merely public law litigation."
This note submits that the Supreme Court's restrictive approach to standing and
injunctive relief in Lyons is representative of the Court's general disapproval of public law
litigation and reflects the Court's desire to limit the role of the federal courts. In its haste
to further a sound policy of judicial restraint, however, the Supreme Court has trans-
formed the law of standing by constitutionalizing the prerequisites for injunctive relief.
Such constitutionalization of the law of remedies does not only limit public law litigation,
but also has serious implications for cases that arise in the non-public law litigation context
where a private party seeks an injunction against a non-governmental defendant.
This note will summarize how the law of standing has been altered by the Lyons
decision, describe how the new standing inquiry has limited public law litigation, and
discuss how the new approach could affect private litigation as well, First, This note will
describe the Supreme Court's restrictive trend that limits public law litigation by describ-
ing the developments in the law of standing and the rules governing the availability of
injunctive relief. Next, the note will consider the reactions of some of the commentators to
the Court's restrictive trend, focusing primarily on the debate that has developed over t he
legitimacy of public law litigation. The note will then review the lower court and Supreme
Court opinions in the Lyons case. A discussion of the impact of Lyons will follow, focusing
on how the Lyons decision has alredy limited public law litigation in the lower courts and
examining how dicta in the Lyons opinion may serve to limit such litigation even further.
Finally, the note will consider the applicability of Lyons in the non-public law litigation
context.
E COURT'S DIRECTION: A RESTRICTIVE TREND THAT Limirrs Pum.ic LAW LITIGATION
Since 1971, the Court has embarked on a restrictive trend that severely limits public
law litigation." One area that reflects this trend is the law of standing, where the Court
"" See supra note 28 and cases cited therein.
'1" See supra note 26 and cases cited therein.
17 See 103 S. Ct. at 1665.
"" See C. WR)Glrr.1,Aw or FEDERAL. Cowers, 60 (4th ed. 1983) (stating that although the standing
question does not often create analytical difficulty in private litigation, the same requirements are
nonetheless applicable).
A federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction extends only to those cases that meet the case or
controversy requirements. if the requirements are not met, the federal court is without power to
hear the complaint. See L. TRIBE, A11F,RICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 52 (1978); Brilinayer, The
jurisprudence of Article 111: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv, L. Kr:v. 297,
297-98 (1979).
See,	 , Franks V. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 754-55 (1976); Seater v. General
Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 516-17 (fit h Or. 1976) (both cases applying Art, I I V case or' controversy
requirement in private litigation suits).
"" See supra note 14.
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has limited the circumstances in which a litigant may enter a federal court to change
government policy." Another area has been the restrictions on the availability of equita-
ble relief, in which the Court has applied principles of federalism to restrain the power of
federal courts to issue injunctions against state government. 4 ' Questions regarding st and-
•ing and the availability of injunctive relief have overlapped to some extent in recent
Supreme Court decisions." I q those decisions, the Court has limited the ability of public
law litigation plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief under both doctrines." Although there
has been an overlap, however, the issues have still been considered separately by the
Court." Both doctrines, therefore, will be considered separately in the succeeding subsec-
tions of this note. Accordingly, this part of the note will summarize the restrictive trend of
the Court, focusing separately on the law of standing and the requirements of injunctive
relief as these rules have been applied by the current court.
A. Standing
Standing has been referred to by commentators as one of the most amorphous
concepts of public law," The inconsistency of the Supreme Court's standing cases has
been noted by members of the Court" and commentators alike. 47
 As recently as 1982, the
Court recognized the difficulty of reconciling the case law, stating: "We need not mince
words when we say that the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with
complete consistency in all of the various cases decided.. . ."" Nevertheless, a general
summary of the law of standing over the last decade is necessary to understand the
Court's trend to limit public law litigation."
According to the Court in recent cases, the question of standing has two dimen-
sions." The first dimension consists of the constitutional case or controversy requirements
of Article III and the second dimension consists of prudential rules of judicial self-
governance that the Court has imposed in the name of judicial restraint." The Article III
4° See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 179-80 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21
(1974).
" See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976).
" See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1666 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 372, 380 (1976); O'Shea v, Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974).
" See supra note 42 and cases cited therein,
" See .supra note 42 and cases cited therein.
`s See ,e.g. , Hearings on S.2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 498 (1966) (statement of Prof, Paul Freund).
" See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). See also Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) ("Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such").
" See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 428-29 (3d ed. 1972) (cited in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 617 n.4 (1973)).
" Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
49
 For a concise summary of the development of the law of standing, see C. WiticHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS, 59 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT). For the Court's most recent
formulation of the law of standing, see Allen v. Wright, 104 S. CI, 3315, 3324-25 (1984) (reviewing
the Court's recent line of standing cases).
" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
si
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case or controversy requirement generally has been articulated as a question of whet her
the plaintiff has alleged a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy."" In order to
assure that a plaintiff has such a personal stake in the outcome, the Court has required
that a plaintiff allege that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining a concrete,
particularized injury. 5' These requirements of "personal stake" anti "concrete injury"
have been reiterated by the current Court in nearly every case where the standing issue
has arisen." The Court, however, has also indicated that even where a plaintiff has
alleged a sufficient injury to satisfy the case or controversy requirements, he still must
overcome prudential standing bars that have been erected by the Court.• 5
The prudential standing rules represent judicial policy decisions through which the
Court seeks to limit the role of the judiciary. 56 Two prudential rules are cited frequently
by the Court. First, the Court will refuse to hear any claims that amount to "generalized
grievances" shared in equal measure with all or a large class of citizens. 57 Second, the
Court will not permit a plaintiff to assert the legal rights or interests of third parties as a
basis of standing, rather, a plaintiff must assert his or her own legal rights to warrant
invocation of federal court jurisdiction." The prudential limitations of standing have not
always been clearly distinguished from the constitutional limitations:59 Only recently has
the Court articulated the difference in a more clearly delineated fashion. 6° As the Court
has defined these limitations, it has formulated an increasingly restrictive law of stand-
ing,"'
Prior to the restrictive trend, it was well-settled that a party could not invoke federal
judicial power unless he could allege "a personal stake in the outcome of the con-
troversy, :412 As the Court stated in the case of Flast v. Callen,' "ftlhe fundamental
aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a
5" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
sa See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72
(1978); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1973).
sa See C. WRiGHT, supra note 49, at 70.
" See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979); Warth v,
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
w See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975).
" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
For an extensive examination of the "generalized grievance restriction," see Note, The Gener-
alized Grievance Restriction: Prudential Restraint or Constitutional Mandate?, 70 GEo. L. j. 1157 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Generalized Grievance Restriction). The author of this Note observes that the
"generalized grievance" restriction has two dimensions. The first is the constitutional dimension
where a party only asserts a "general interest" in a problem. The second is the prudential dimension
where the plaintiff has asserted an injury sufficient under Article III, but does not have standing
because his "harm" is a "generalized grievance" shared with other citizens. Id. at 1173 - 74.
se Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). See C. WRIGHT, supra note 49, at 70-71.
59 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that the policy considerations have not
always been clearly distinguished from the constitutional considerations).
" See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
6 ' See C. WRIGHT, supra note 49, at 67.
62 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)).
69
 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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federal court arid not On the issues he wishes to have adjudicated."' The focus of the
standing inquiry, therefore, was whether the particular plaintiff whose standing was
challenged was a "proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not
whether the issue itself [was] justiciable."" In cases subsequent to Flast, the personal stake
requirement has been repeated as a threshold consideration of the case or controversy
requirement of Article Ill." In recent cases, however, the personal stake requirement has
become Sy 110[10111011S with  the requirement of actual injury to the plaintiff."' As the Court
indicated in a 1973 case: "Although the law of sta nding has greatly changed in the last 10
years, we have steadfastly adhered to the requirement that „ federal plaintiffs must
allege some threatened or actual injury resulting front the putatively illegal action before
a Federal court may assume jurisclict ion."" Since 1973, the Court has further refined the
"personal stake" clement of' the case or controversy requirement, embarking on a restric-
tive trend that has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief'.
One of the first cases in which the Court took steps to restrict the law of standing was
O'Shea v. Littleton ."" In O'Shea, a civil rights class action suit was filed under section 1983"
against various law enforcement and court officials, including a judge and a county
magistrate." According 10 the plaintiff's complaint, the officials had engaged in continu-
ing activities of illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and jury-lee practices which deprived the
plaintiffs of their rights under the constitution:72 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief'
against the state and local officials to prevent them from continuing the alleged uncon-
stitutional practices against others." When the case reached the Supreme Court, the
Court denied the plaintiffs injunctive relief on two grounds. First, the Court held that the
plaintiffs failed to meet the case or controversy requirements.'" Second, the Court held
that even if' the plaintiffs had alleged a case or controversy, they had failed to meet the
requirements injunctive relief.'
In deciding whether the plaintiffs had met the Article 111 requirements, the Court
relied on the principle articulated in Nast that plaintiffs must he able to show "a personal
64 Id. at 99.
" Id. No 100.
" See, e.g., Roc V, Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 123 (1973); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 106 U.S.
583, 586 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972); Barlow v, Collins, 397 U.S. 159,
164 (1970).
67 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978)
(The Court stated: "As relined by subsequent reformulation, I his requirement of a 'personal slake'
has conic to he understood to require ... a 'distinct and palpable injury'. . ." .), See also Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Wirth v, Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498-99
(1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493.94 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
616-17 (1973).
The "personal stake" requirement also includes the requirement that there he a " 'fairly trace-
able' causal connection between the claimed injury and the challetiged conduce." See Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Enviromnimtal Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 73 (1978).
Linda R.S. v, Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
" 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
7"
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Stipp. V 1981).
414 U.S. at 490.
" Id. at 491-92.
7" Id. at 493. The Court indicated that the injunctive relief sought included "a requirement of
'periodic reports (rival -4ms types of aggregate data on actions (in bail arid sentencing.' "M. at 493
((pawing Littleton v. lierbling, 468 F.2(1 389, 415 (711t Cir. 1972)).
414 U.S. at 493
7' Id. at 499. See iVra notes 150.56 and accompanying text.
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stake in the outcome."7 6 According to the Court, abstract injury would not he enough, a
plaintiff must he able to allege that he " 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury.' "77 After reciting- this Article 111 principle, the O'Shea Court
applied the case or controversy requirement in a more restrictive fashion. During oral
argument, plaintiffs' counsel had alleged that the plaintiffs had, in fact, suffered from
unconstitutional practices.'" In response to this claim of injury, the Court held: "Past
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects."" The
O'Shea Court concluded that while past wrongs serve as evidence of a threat of future
injury, the threat of future injury in this case was "simply too remote" to satisfy the case or
controversy requirement."
Two years later, the Court used the principle of O'Shea in the 1976 case of Rizzo v.
Goode." Rizzo involved two class action suits filed under section 1983"' against the Mayor
of Philadelphia, the Police Commissioner and other officials, alleging a pattern of uncon-
stitutional mistreatment of citizens by Philadelphia police officers." The plaintiffs, citi-
zens of Philadelphia, sought various forms of injunctive relief against the police depart-
ment in order to prevent future abuses." The district court found widespread violations
of constitutional rights by the police" and ordered a comprehensive program fbr dealing
with citizen complaints." After the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's order," the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the district court's order was an
unwarranted federal court intrusion into the discretionary functions of the local
officials."' The Court, citing three separate grounds for its decision, concluded that the
order did constitute such an intrusion and reversed the lower courts." First, according to
the Court, the plaintiffs failed to meet the case or controversy requirements." Second, the
Court held that the plaintiffs could not make out a case that created statutory liability
under section 1983." Finally, the Court held that the doctrine of federalism would
preclude an injunction under principles governing the availability of equitable relief."'
In considering whether the plaintiffs as individuals had alleged a case or controversy,
the Court relied on the principle of O'Shea that "[Nast exposure to illegal conduct does
not in itself show a present case or controversy. . . ."" The Court stated that the plaintiff's'
" Id. at 494 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
77
 Id.
" Id. at 495.
" Id. at 495-96.
" M. at 498. One commentator has viewed the O'Shea holding as "blend[Mg] standing with both
ripeness and moot ness concerns." WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §
3531 at 231 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER).
423 U.S. 362 (1976).
82 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
93
 423 U.S. at 366.
94
 Council of Organizations on Phila. Police A. & R. v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1290 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
95 Id. at 1318.
ld. at 1320.
97 423 U.S. at 366.
" Id.
" Id. at 366.
9° Id. at 372-73.
" Id. at 377.
9'2 Id. at 380. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
93 Id. at 372 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495.96 (1974)).
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past exposure to police misconduct., and the "attenuated" allegations of future injury were
insufficient to meet the requirements of Article III."' Accordingly, the Court found that
the individual plaintiffs had tailed to show the required "personal stake in the outcome"
necessary to warrant invocation of federal court jurisdiction." By applying the holding of
O'Shea, the Rizzo Court reaffirmed the principle that even if a plaintiff can show past
exposure to illegal conduct, it may not he enough for an actual case or controversy when
that plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief.
In 1974, the Court further elaborated on the restrictions of the case or controversy
requirement in the companion cases" of U.S, v. Richardson" and Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War. 98 Richardson involved a suit brought by federal taxpayers to
obtain an order declaring the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 unconstitutional."" Because
the Act permitted an accounting of agency expenditures solely to the CIA Director, the
plaintiffs alleged that the Act violated Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 of the constitution that
mandates a public accounting of government expenditures. 00 The Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs failed to meet the case or controversy requirement,'°' According to the
Court, the plaintiffs were asserting nothing more than an interest in the use of public
funds. 102 Such an assertion, the Court stated, was an impermissible attempt " 'to employ a
federal court as a forum in which to air [their] generalized grievances about the conduct
of government.' "")3 Since the plaintiffs could allege no danger of suffering any direct
injuries, they had failed to meet the threshold requirement of Article Ill.'" In reaching
its decision, the Court rejected the argument that if these plaintiffs did not have standing
to litigate, then no one would be able to litigate the issue.“* Such an assertion could not be
used as a basis for standing. In fact, the Court reasoned, the absence of a party who was
able to sue supported the argument that the issue was better left to the democratic
process.'"
94 id.
95 Id.
w The cases were decided on the sante day.
97
 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
" 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
99
 418 U.S. at 169.
Id.
'" See id. at 170.
102 Id. at 177.
' 1)3 Id. at 175 (quoting Elam v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
Id. at 180.
105 Id. at 179.
106 Id. The Court stated:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can
do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particidar individual or class to litigate
these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. Any other conclusion
would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of
an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the
National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts. The Constitution created
a representative Government with the representatives directly responsible to their con-
stituents at stated periods of two, four and six years; that the Constitution does not
afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable the citizen who is not.
satisfied with the "ground rules" established by the Congress for reporting expendi-
tures of the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III
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In the companion case of Reservists, the plaintiffs brought suit as both citizens and
taxpayers against the Secretary of Defense, alleging that Reserve membership of mem-
bers of Congress violated the Incompatibility Clause of the constitution."" Echoing its
decision in Richardson, the Court found that the plaintiffs were asserting nothing more
than "generalized grievances,'" and held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because of
their failure to allege a concrete injury." In sum, the Reservists Court reaffirmed the
principle in Richardson that a plaintiff who asserts nothing more than a general interest in
common with members of the public, lacks standing in the constitutional sense because
such a "generalized grievance" fails to meet the concrete injury requirement of Article
111."°
In subsequent standing cases, the Court indicated that even if a plaintiff can allege an
injury that meets the minimum constitutional requirement, he still lacks standing on
prudential grounds if his injury is one that is shared by all Ir a large group of other
citizens."' The case that first clearly delineated the difference between these constitu-
tional and prudential limitations of standing was Warth tr, Sehlin . 1 ' 2 In Warth, the Court
denied standing to several plaintiffs who attempted to use a federal district court as a
vehicle to challenge certain local zoning laws.'" The suit was brought by various organiza-
tions and individuals of the Rochester, N.Y., metropolitan area to challenge the zoning
laws of the suburban town of Penfield.' The plaintiffs alleged that the zoning laws
excluded persons of low income froth living in Penfield, in violation of the constitution
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983." 5
Before considering the merits of the case, Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
reviewed the principles of the law of standing." According to the Court, the standing
inquiry involves both constitutional and prudential limitations. 117 Both limitations, the
Court stated, are founded in a "concern about the proper—and properly limited — role
of the courts in a democratic society.""" Turning first to the constitutional case or
controversy requirement, the Court framed the inquiry as a question "whether the
plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to
warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction. . .""" According to the Court, the
jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the
polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process
may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of the political
branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors
that elected representatives ate delinquent in performing duties committed to them.
418 U.S. at 179 (emphasis in original).
'" 481 U.S. at 210.
1" Id. at 217.
1 " See id. at 220.
ll° See C. WRIGHT, supra note 49, at 67.
"' See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 61, 99 - 100 (1979); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 -99 (1975).
112 422 U.S. 490 (1975). For a critical commentary on Warth v. Seldin, see Sager', Insular Majorities
Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HAIW. I.. REV. 1373
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Sager].
1 " 422 U.S. at 517 - 18.
"4 Id. at 493.
1 ' 5 Id.
"" Id. at 498-502.
117 Id. at 498.
118 Id .
18 hi. at 498-99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) (emphasis in original).
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judiciary is available only to remedy past. injuries or protect against. fut ure injuries. 1" The
Court reasoned that. the threshold inquiry required by Article i II in every case, therefore,
is whether the plaintiff has suffered an actual or threatened injury. 121 The Court indi-
cated, however, that even if the minimum constitutional requirement is met, a plaintiff
must still overcome the prudential limitations of standing.''
The Court defined two prudential limitations. 12' Firtil , the Court stated, where a
plaintiff's injury "is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all
or a large class of citizens," exercise of the court's jurisdiction is not warranted.' Second,
the Court continued, a plaintiff cannot assert the legal rights or interests of third
parties," he must assert his own rights and interests in order to be granted standing.' 2'
The Court explained that the prudential limitations restrain a court from considering
"abstract questions of wide public significance" where the issues are better left to other
institutions of government that are more competent to address public concerns.' 2" After
reviewing the law of standing, the Court moved directly to a consideration of whether t he
parties in the matter beibre it had standing,'" ultimately concluding that none of the
plaintiffs had met the necessary requirements. 12$ The individuals of low and moderate
income, according to the Court, lacked standing because they failed to allege the demon-
strable, particularized injury necessary under Article Ill to warrant federal court inter-
vention. "9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reminded the parties of "the availability
of the normal democratic process" as a way of changing local ordinances."' The Court
also found that the other individuals and organizations involved in the case lacked
standing because they were either asserting the rights of others,' or failed to assert
injury sufficient under Article III."' Worth, like the other standing cases previously
discussed, had the effect of making it very difficult for a plaintiff who is dissatisfied with
government policies to have his complaint heard in a federal court.
Emerging from this line of cases is a restrictive law of standing. The current Court
has consistently held that in order' to meet the case or controversy requirement, a plaintiff
' 2 ' Id. at 499.
"I See id.
122 See id.
123 Id.
'24 Id. For an examination of the generalized grievance restriction, see Generalized Grievance
Regriction, supra note 57.
' 2 ' 422 U.S. at 499,
1211 Id. at 500.
'' Id. ad 502,
12$ Id. at 518.
12' Id. at 508.
'3° Id. at 508 n.18. The Court stated:
We also note that zoning laws and their provisions, long considered essential to effective
urban planning, are peculiarly within the province of stare and local legislative au-
thorities. They are, of course, subject to judicial review in a proper case. But citizens
dissatisfied with provisions of such laws need not overlook t he availability of the normal
democratic process.
Id „See Sager, supra note 112, at 1389, for a critical discussion of this footnote.
1 :" Id. at 509.
132 Id. at 516.
113 See supra note 67 and cases cited therein. In addition encompassing allegation of injury, the
"personal stake" requirement also requires that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged
action." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976). See Allen v. Wright,
104 S. Ct. 3315, 3328-30 (1984) (applying the "fairly traceable" requirement).
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must demonstrate a "personal stake in the outcome" by alleging a concrete injury.'"
Where the plaintiff seeks an injunction, however, a past injury will not be enough unless
there is a "real and immediate threat" that injury will recur.' 34 In addition, where a
plaintiff merely asserts a general interest in having government conducted constitution-
ally, he will also fail to meet the direct injury requirement of Article 111.' 33 Finally, even if
a plaintiff alleges injury sufficient under Article 111, he still must overcome prudential
limitations of standing that the Court has established as rules of judicial self-restraint to
limit the role of the judiciary."'
B. The Requirements fir lqjunclive Relief
Apart from the threshold restriction of standing, the Court has restricted public law
litigation by tightening the requirements for injunctive reliel." 7 According to the current
Court, principles of federalism that. govern the relationship between the federal and state
governments limit the circumstances in which a federal court may issue an injunction
against a branch of state government. 138 This restriction on the equitable power of federal
courts is rooted in the 197I landmark case of Younger a. Harris,'" where the Court's
reasoning planted the seeds of federalism upon which later Supreme Court cases would
re l y. m
In Younger, the plaintiff had been indicted in a California state court under a State
Penal Code statute known as the Criminal Syndicalism Act."' Subsequently, the plaintiff
filed a suit in federal court seeking an injunction to prevent the District Attorney from
prosecuting hint under the Act. 141 The plaintiff alleged that both the prosecution and the
Act. as written inhibited him front exercising his rights of free speech under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." The Supreme Court held that except under extraordinary
circumstances, a federal court may not enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings.'"
in reaching its decision, the Younger Court blended two principles. First, the Court stated
the basic doctrine of equity that a court will not enjoin a criminal proceeding where an
adequate remedy at law exists and the plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm if denied
the relief requested."' Second, the Court invoked the notion of comity and "Our
Federalism," stating that a proper respect for state institutions and a belief that the
federal government should not interfere with legitimate state activities compelled a
1" See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).
See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974).
136 See Warth v. Seklin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
137 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976).
'" Id. at 380.
' 39 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The literature on Younger is voluminous. For a selective list of articles on
Younger, see C. WRmirr, supra note 49, § 52A at 320 n. I. For further lists of sources, see WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, SUPra note 80, § 4251 at 537 n.14, 453 n.37, and § 4252 at 544 n.l. See also Theis,
lounger v. Harris: Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGS L. j. 103, 103 n. t (1981).
' 4° See, e.g., City or Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. CI. 1660, 1670 (1983); Real Estate Association v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 112 (1981); Rizzo v. Goode, 422 U.S. 362, 380 (1976); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S, 488, 499 (1974). For a concise
description of the evolution of Younger federalism see C. WinGicr, supra note 49, § 52A at 320.
141 401 U.S, at 38.
141 Id. at 39.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 40-41.
'" Id. at 43 -44.
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decision to restrain i he federal court from issuing the injunction.'" Although the Younger
Court left unclear whether the primary basis for the decision was the doctrine of equity or
the principles of federalism, it was the second basis t hat had the broadest impact on the
scope of federal equitable power. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions relied on the
principles of federalism lo limit federal injunctive power in cases not involving a criminal
prosecution. 147
The case of O'Shea v. Littleton 14" was one of those cases that cited Younger as grounds
fir such a limitation.'" As discussed previously, O'Shea involved a civil rights class action
suit filed against law enforcement and court officials fist' alleged unconstitutional bond-
setting, sentencing and jury-fee practices."" In the first portion of the opinion, the Court
held that the plaintiffs had failed to allege an actual case or controversy.''' In addition to
holding that the complaint did not present a case or controversy, however, the Court
offered an alternative holding in part two of the opinion to reinforce its decision to deny
injunctive relief.'"
The Court beg-an the second part of the opinion by stating that the Article Ill
considerations it had just discussed shaded into those considerations necessary for deter-
mining whether the complaint stated a sound basis for granting equitable relief.'"
Without specifically referring to how the case or controversy considerations shade into the
determinations for equitable relief, the Court held that even if the plaintiffs had met the
hi. at 44-45. The Court stated:
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal
prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of "comity,"
that is, a proper respect fin - state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up .of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This perhaps for
lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our
Federalism,-
 and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal
Constitution into existence is hound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals
dreams of "Our Federalism." The concept does not mean blind deference to "States'
Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in
our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses.
What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of both State and National Governments, in which the National Government,
anxious though it may he to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests,
always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism,"
horn in the early struggling clays of our Union of States, occupies a highly important
place in our Nation's history and its future.
Id.
147 See supra note 140 and cases cited therein.
' 48
 414 U.S. 488 (1974). See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
"9
 Id. at 499.
15° See id. at 490. See supra notes 69 - 80 and accompanying text.
Id. at 492 -93„ We supra notes 69 -80 and accompanying text.
1 " Id. at 499.
''" Id. at 499. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun asserted that the Court was writing "ail
advisory ()pillion that we ate powerless to render - whe n I he 0/1111 Considered the question of
equitable relief in part II. Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Douglas made the same
observation. /d. at 512 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660,
1682 (1983) (where Justice Marshall makes a similar criticism).
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Article III requirements, they had failed to state an adequate basis for equitable relief.'"
In reaching this determination, the Court cited Younger, and stated that principles of
federalism precluded injunctive relief in the case before 4.' 1' 5 According to the Court, the
injunction sought by t he plaintiffs would indirectly cause the same type of interference
with criminal proceedings that the Younger Court had sought to prohibit.'"
Although the invocation of the principles of equity and federalism was only dictum in
the O'Shea opinion, the reasoning of that dictum was later used by the Court in the case of
Rizzo v. Goode.'" As discussed earlier, Rizzo involved a section 1983 class action suit.
brought against officials of the City of Philadelphia for allegedly pervasive unconstitu-
tional police misconduct.'" The Court initially ruled that the plaintiffs as individuals
failed to meet the case or controversy requirements.'" In addition to its holding on
Article Ili grounds, however, the Court also denied injunctive relief on grounds of
equitable principles, '"° In that portion of the Court's opinion, the Court rejected the claim
made by the plaintiffs that citizens have a right to federal equitable relief where govern-
ment officials do not take steps to minimize unconstitutional police misconduct.' 4 i In
rejecting this claim made by the plaintiffs, the Court held that principles of federalism
must be given appropriate consideration in determining the scope of federal equitable
re lie f . to
Although Y ounger v. Harris was not cited in the Rizzo Court's opinion,"'' the Court did
cite O'Shea v. Littleton for the proposition that, even outside of the context of state criminal
proceedings, principles of equity and federalism weigh against the issuance of' an injunc-
tion. 1°" The Court stated that principles of federalism are not limited to cases involving
1" 414 U.S. at 499. The Court never explained how case-or-controversy considerations shade
into the determination for equitable relief, but the Court may have been referring to the injury
requirement of each consideration. Article 111 requires a showing "that the plaintiff is being
threatened by some injury for which he has no adequate legal remedy." WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 33, § 2942, at '368-69.
M
 414 U.S. at 499.
Id. at 500.
1 " 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976) (see supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text). For commen-
taries both critical and favorable of the Rizzo decision, see e.g. Chayes, 1976, supra note 7, at 1305
(critical); Cox, Federalism and Constitutional Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 15
(1978) (critical); Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 17, at 1159 (critical); Howard, supra note 5, at 427
(favorable); Mishkin, supra note 7, at 973 (favorable); Nagel,supra note 9, at 715 (favorable); Redish,
The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deftrence In Search of a Rational, 63 Cousrm,t, L. REv. 463, 470
(1978) (critical); Note, Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies For Police Misconduct, 112 VA. L. REv. 1259
(1976) (critical); Casenote, Availability of Federal Equitable Relief Against Police Supervisory Personnel, 90
HARV, L. REv. 238 (1976) (critical). For a very harsh attack on the Supreme Court decision in Rizzo,
see generally Weinberg, supra note 10.
1 " Id. at 366.
'" Id. at 372-73. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
1 " Id. at 377-80.
Id. at 378.
1" Id. at 379.
it is unclear why Justice Rehnquist did not cite Younger, since he cited O'Shea for the
reference to federalism. 423 U.S. at 379-80 (The O'Shea Court relied on Younger in its consideration
of federalism. See 414 U.S. at 499-500). Perhaps, Justice Rehnquist, in his effort to demonstrate the
broad application of the principles of federalism, omitted the citation of Younger in order to avoid
any suggestion that federalism applies only to limited situations. Implicit in the omission of the
Younger citation may be the notion that federalism acts as a limitation on the federal government in a
broad sense, of which the Younger doctrine is only one example. See infra note 432.
144 423 U.S. at 379.
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injunctions sought against criminal proceedings.' 65 According to the Court, those princi-
ples are also applicable to cases where injunctive relief is sought against an executive
branch of state or local government. 166 The Court indicated that it was inappropriate for
the federal court 10 have injected itself into the internal affairs of the local police
department, , ''' and reversed the order for equitable relief.'"
By holding that the principles of federalism restrain a federal court from issuing an
injunction, the Rizzo Court formulated a potentially broad restriction on federal court
injunctive power. The holding of Rizzo, taken together with the language of Younger and
O'Shea, established the principle that except in extraordinary circumstances where the
danger of irreparable injury is "both grezt. and iinmediate," a federal court may not issue
an injunction that intrudes into the internal affairs of an executive branch of state
government.'" After Rizzo, the implications of federalism for public law litigation plain-
tiffs could not be overstated.
The Court's restrictive trend has not gone unchallenged by dissenting members of
the Court. The decisions limiting public law litigation have been far front unanimous. 170
While a majority of the Court has taken steps to limit the availability of such suits,
dissenting members of the Court have been highly critical of the Court's decisions."'
I" Id. at 380.
160 Id. The Court stated:
Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important part in governing
the relationship between federal courts and state governments, thought initially ex-
pounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in cases where it was sought to
enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have not been limited either to that situation
or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself. We think these principles likewise have
applicability where injunctive relief is sought, not against the judicial branch of the stale
government, but against an executive branch of an agency of state or local governments
such as petitioners here.
Id.
Iti7
'"" Id. at 381.
l "" See id. at 379; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 199 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
44, 46 (1971).
17" See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (5-3 decision); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 492
(1975) (5-4 decision); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167 (1974) (5-4 decision); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S, 488, 489 (1974) (6-3 decision).
m See,e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 387 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The facts, the
deprival of const itutional rights, and the pattern, are all proved in sufficient degree. And the remedy
is carefully delineated.... II is a matter of regret that the Court sees fit to nullify what so meticul-
ously and thought fully has been evolved to satisfy an existing need relating to constitutional rights
that we cherish and hold dear." Id.); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 520 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("While the Court gives lip service to the principle, oft repeated in recent years, that
'standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is
illegal,' ... in fact the opinion, which tosses out of court almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff
who could be injured by the activity claimed to be unconstitutional, can be explained only by an
indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits." Id. (citation and footnote omitted)); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 239-40 (1974) (Marshall, (., dissenting) ("It is a
sad commentary on our priorities that a litigant who contends that a violation of a federal statute has
interfered with his aesthetic appreciation of natural resources can have that claim heard by a federal
court, ... while one who contends that a violation of a specific provision of the United States
Constitution has interfered with the effectiveness of expression protected by the First Amendment is
turned away without a hearing on the merits of his claim." Id.).
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Sonic of these dissenters have criticized the majority for reshaping the doctrines of
jurisdiction, justiciability and remedy in order to bar litigants with substantial claims from
entering federal court.' In addition, they have criticized the Court for distorting the
doctrine of fecleralism and condoning violations of civil liberties. 17 ' In the dissenters' view,
the Supreme Court in these cases "has gone on to limit the protective role of the federal
judiciary." l74
D. THE DEBATE. OVER PUBLIC I.Aw
The restrictive trend developed by the Supreme Court in recent public law litigation
cases has aroused both favorable and critical responses from the commentators.' 73 Those
commentators favoring the Court's trend assert that a limited policymaking role of the
judiciary in a democratic (.4 ' government makes public law litigation in the federal
courts inappropriate.'" On the other hand, those critical of the Court's trend maintain
that public law litigation is desirable because, in their view, the role of the courts in our
constitutional system is to oversee the other branches of government and prevent con-
stitutional violations. 177 Each of these views on the validity of public law litigation in the
federal courts will be considered separately in the following section.
Many commentators who view public law litigation as inappropriate are concerned
with preserving the democratic political process. 178 According to these commentators, the
judicial orders issued in public law litigation intrude into the democratic decision-making
process in a way that the normal invalidation of a law on constitutional grounds does
In the course of normal constitutional adjudication, a federal court generally
invalidates a law and prohibits the government from acting unconstitutionally.' 80 In
public law litigation, however, a federal court issues an affirmative order that mandates
the government to administer one of its institutions in a prescribed fashion.'" These
connuentators assert that such affirmative judicial orders eliminate the discretion given to
the legislative and executive branches of government and displace the normal democratic
1 " juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 346 (1977) (Brennan, j., dissenting).
rri
174 Ir1. The dissenters have been particularly critical of the majority's trend to limit the availabil-
ity of suits filed under section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Stipp. V 1981). Id. at 342. The
dissenters have claimed that Congress intended to make the federal courts the primary vindicators of
constitutional rights when Congress enacted section 1983. Id. See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 240 (1972). As justice Brennan has asserted: "The very purpose of section 1983 was to interpose
the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights, . " 430 U.S. at 342 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 242). The debate over the role
of the federal judiciary in the context of section 1983 is a subject that is not within the scope of this
article. For more extensive discussions, see Developments — Section 1983 _supra note 14 (An extensive
exam inat of section 1983 and how it has developed Since the Civil War, The authors are critical of
the Court's restrictive trend and call for Congressional action. Id. at 1360-61); Howard, supra note 5
(a more 1:1VI)rable examination of the Court's trend to restrict section 1983. See id. at 434 -38).
'" See supra notes 9.10 and articles cited therein.
175 See, e.g., Frug, supra note 9, at 734-35; Mishkin, supra note 7, at 975-76.
' 77 See, e.g., Chayes, 1982, supra note 7, at 60.
See, e.g., Frug,supra note 9, at 734-35; Howard, supra note 5, at 426; Mishkin,supra note 7, at
975-76.
1711 Howard, supra note 5, at 426.
'"" See id.
See id.
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and political processes.'" To support their argument, these commentators have em-
phasized how the remedies ordered in public law litigation cases impact. the financial
resou rces of government. I"
 They have argued that judges are normally concerned with
the conditions to he remedied in the cases before them and rarely consider the impact of
their decisions on the limited financial resources of government.'" As a result, these
commentators maintain, public funds are allocated to resolve the problems of the case
before the court at the expense of other problems not before it.'" This criticism manifests
the belief that courts are not as competent as the legislative or executive branches of
government to make social policy.'" This view is most clearly articulated by Professor
Horowitz, a frequently cited critic of public law litigation.'"
Professor Horowitz has identified five characteristics inherent in the "adjudicative
process" that severely limit a court's ability to formulate social policy.'" First, Horowitz
has asserted that the initial inquiry undertaken by courts, concerning the rights and duties
of the parties, defers the consideration of alternatives to a later stage in the inquiry. 18 "
This limited approach, according to Professor Horowitz, prevents courts from analyzing
cost factors in the formulation of' a solution. 19" As a result, he argues, the court's attitude
reflects the view that "if a person possesses a right, he possesses it whatever the cost."' 9 '
Second, Professor Horowitz recognizes the "piecemeal" quality of litigation' 9
 which
permits a judge to decide only the particular issues before the court. Because courts must
decide issues on a case by case basis, Horowitz argues, they lack a comprehensive view.'"
In addition, the courts are not capable of altering course as a legislature can when
unanticipated problems a rise. ` 94
The third factor that Horowitz has labeled as a limitation on the court's ability to
determine social policy is the "passivity of the judicial process."'" "Passivity" refers to the
characteristic of the judiciary that requires a court to decide only the case before it.'"
Effective social policytnaking, according to Professor Horowitz, requires an ability to
initiate action and formulate a solution that will resolve the probleins faced by the
majority of people in the particular situation.' 97
 In Horowitz's view, a court is not capable
of such action because it is forced to act on the case before it even if that case is not
1 " See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 6, at 637; Frug, supra note 9, at 735; Howard, supra note 5, at
426.
'" See,e.g,, Frug,supra note 9, at 733; Glazer,supra note 9, at 118; Howard,supra note 5, at 426.
"4 See, e.g., Glazer, supra time 9, at 118; Howard, supra note 5 at 426.
"s See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 9, at 118; Howard, supra note 5, at 426.
"6 See, e.g., Glazer, .supra note 9, at 118.
' 87 D. Hottowrrz, supra note 9, at 17-19. Buf see Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term 
— Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. 12.1w. 1, 31-35 (1979); Goldstein, supra note 10, at 45-48 (both
conunentators are critical of Horowitz's arguments).
I"
 1). HOROWITZ, .supra note 9, at 33-56. But see A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL
A CT] vism, 233-34 (1982) (calling for the courts to become more activist in "making public policy").
1" D. HoROwrrz, supra note 9, at 34.
EN) d
IDI Id.
"2
 Id. w 35.
"" See id. at 37.
104 See id. at 36-37.
'"' Id. at 38.
See id,
"7 See id. in 39, 41.
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representative of the broader problems in need of solution.'" Fourth, Professor Horowitz
recognizes that a court. is ill-adapted to the task of ascertaining social facts beyond the
history of the case before it.'" Horowitz maintains that the formulation of general policy
requires the ascertainment of social facts that are "the recurrent patterns of behavior on
which policy must be based."'" The adjudicative process, in Horowitz's view, places its
emphasis on the specific, historical facts of the individual case rather than the social
facts.'" He asserts that the practical result of this approach is that a court may be
formulating policy without the empirical data necessary for an effective policy decision." 0 "
The final factor identified by Professor Horowitz, is that litigation is directed towards
remedying past injustices rather than planning for the future.'" As a consequence,
Horowitz asserts, the courts lack the necessary ability to review, monitor and control the
plans that they set in motion." p4 Professor Horowitz maintains that courts lack the re-
sources to minimize unintended consequences, and more important, they lack t he re-
sources to correct those consequences once they occur."'
The view that clentocratic decision-making is preferable to judicial decision-making is
not the only argument, however, that is cited by the critics of public law litigation.
According to these critics, federalism, a doctrine related to the preference fbr democratic
decision-making, also imposes limits on public law lit igat ion."' The doctrine of federalism
represents a concern for local control over local institutions." 0i According to sonic com-
mentators, federalism requires that federal courts refrain from interrupting or intruding
upon local decision-making." a These commentators maintain that federalism is impli-
cated in public law litigation when a federal court orders systematic relief that mandates
state expenditure of funds.'" At least one of these commentators has argued that such
federal supervision is an improper invasion of state responsibilities."' According to this
view, the limitation of federalism should be applied as a restriction in public law litigation
cases in order to ensure that such federal court intrusions are minimized.'" According to
1 " Id. at 41.
"9 Id. at 45.
Id.
20L Id.
202 See id. at 50-51.
'" Id. at 51.
'" Id. at 56.
"5 Id. at 52.
"6 See, e.g., Frug, supra note 9, at 743.
2" See, e.g., Howard, supra note 5, at 428.
See, e.g., Frug, supra note 9, at 747-48: Howard, supra note 5, at 426.
109 See, e.g., Frog, supra note 9, at 743; Howard, supra note 5, at 426.
For a critical examination of the re-emergence of federalism, see Powell, The Compleal lefferso-
nian: Juslice Rehnquig and Federalism, 91 YALE. L. J. 1317 (1982) ]hereinafter cited as Powell].
21 ° Frug, supra note 9, at 748.
2 " Id. Frug takes a very strict view of federalism as "an absolute bar to a federal remedy" in
institution cases, id. at 748. He asserts, however, that in cases of 'justiciable fourteenth amendment
violations," federalism does not preclude such relief. Id. He states:
The fourteenth amendment itself, however, increases federal power over state ac-
tivities; therefore, cases like User'', which limit federal power under the commerce
clause, and O'Shea arid Rizzo, which involve no justiciable fourteenth amendment
violations, should not preclude a federal judicial remedy in cases, such as the institution
cases, in which fourteenth amendment violations are established.
The mere existence of a fourteenth amendment violation does not mean, however,
that all restraints on the federal government in its relations with the states are elimi-
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some commentators, the notion of forum allocation, a belief that state courts should he
adjudicating the public law litigation cases rather than the federal courts, is also inherent.
in the doctrine of federalism."" According to this view, decisions affecting local institu-
tions should he made by slate courts because such tribunals are closer to the people
affected by their decisions and, therefore, are better equipped than a federal court to
appreciate and account for local conditions.'"
The principles of federalism reinforce the view that the role of the federal judiciary
in our system of government is a limited one. As one commentator has stated, it is not the
role of the federal courts to solve all of society's problems, it is their role to set the
perimeters within which the democratic process can work.'" In marked contrast to this
view of a limited judiciary, however, is the view of the advocates of public law litigation.
Despite the numerous criticisms of public law litigation, there is substantial support
for such federal court activity.'" Two of the commentators who have supported federal
court involvement in public law litigation, Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell, disagree with
those critics who suggest that federal courts lack the capacity to efficiently supervise local
institutions.'" According to Eisenberg and Yeazell, there is nothing extraordinary about
public law litigation because courts have demonstrated their capacity to supervise com-
plex institutions through the well-established activity of monitoring executors and trust-
ees of very large estates and businesses.' Given the courts' historical involvement in such
complicated supervisory functions, Eisenberg and Yeazell maintain that it is not an abuse
of judicial power for courts to ensure the protection of constitutional rights by supervising
state and local authorities when necessary.'" According to Eisenberg and Yeazell, public
law litigation, as a practical matter, presents very little that is new to court. activity.""
Eisenberg and Yeazell state that although the nature of modern enterprises may, by itself,
nated„ .. The principles of federalism are still applicable in cases of fourteenth
amendment violations to ensure that the federal courts minimize their incursions into
the area of state sovereignty. In that sense, the principles of federalism must be
considered in formulating the remedy in the institution cases.
Id. at 748-49.
The strict view that federalism acts as an absolute bar has been disputed. See Mishkin, supra note
9, at 975. Mishkin, in response to Professor Frug's view, states:
I believe that such an extreme reading is unwarranted, Justice Rehnquist's analysis [in
Rizzo] of the relevant statutory and case material does tend to emphasize restrictions on
federal court authority, but careful examination of his language and handling of
authority should make dear that no absolute barrier was erected.
Id. at 975.
2 ' 2 See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JUR/SDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW, 90 (1973) [hereinalier cited as H.
FRIENDLY]; Howard, .supra note 5, at 391; Sager, supra note 112, at 1389; Wells, The Role of Comity in
the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C.L. REV. 59, 65 (1981). See also State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's,
22 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 599 (1981) (a symposium on the choice between state and federal courts for
constitutional adjudication). But see Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV, L. REV. 1105 (1977)
(rejects notion that state courts should be preferred over federal courts).
9 "See Sager, supra note 112, at 1391; Sherin, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's: Comment, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 789, 799 (1981).
2 " Mishkin, supra note 7, at 976.
215 See supra note 10 and articles cited therein.
' 16
 Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 10, at 496.
"7 See id. at 494.
"8 Id.
219 Id. at 474.
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he more complex than that of the past, judicial involvement in the oversight of such
enterprises is not at all distinct from the historical role played by courts."°
In addition to their argument that there is nothing extraordinary about public law
litigation, Eisenberg and Yeazell have also maintained that the doctrine of federalism
should not be a bar to public law litigation."' They assert. that sufficient deference to state
officials can he given by the courts by "seeking guidance from those officials in the
formulation of equitable remedies."' Eisenberg and Yeazell have also rejected the argu-
ment that public law litigation should be curtailed because such litigation intrudes on the
legislative prerogative to allocate funds as the legislature sees fit."' According to these
professors, the legitimacy of federal judicial orders affecting the public fisc is already
well-established."2" They maintain that any criticism of the judicial orders in public law
litigation should focus on the substantive rights created and the merits of allocating funds
in cacti individual case, rather than the legitimacy of such court. orders in general."'
Another noted supporter of public law litigation is Professor Chayes. Professor
Chayes describes public law litigation as a relatively recent judicial development.' In
Chayes' view, the emergence of public law litigation was necessary in order to meet the
demands for justice in our complex society."' Chayes maintains that this need for the
courts to oversee bureaucratic actions should not be viewed as being in conflict with the
roles of the legislative or executive branches."" As Professor Chayes has observed,
bureaucratic actions are not necessarily the result of democratic decision-making." 9
According to Chayes, the courts should he able to work as partners with the legislative and
executive branches to ensure that bureaucracies carry out their programs properly, while
at the same time protecting the individuals affected by the bureaucratic actions."'"
Judge Frank M. Johnson of the Fifth Circuit is another outspoken advocate of"
judicial activism and public law litigation."' According to Judge Johnson, the increase in
public law litigation is due to the "increasingly prominent role government has conic to
play in our society. - 2:12 He justifies court involvement in the institutional cases on the
grounds that one of the courts' most important duties is "to secure the integrity of the
relationship of private citizens to government."' 33 According to Judge Johnson, as long as
public officials disregard their responsibility to govern constitutionally, the judiciary must
intervene to the extent necessary in order to protect the rights of the deprived. 2"4 In
Judge Johnson's view, it is the role of the courts in our system of government that permits
and, indeed, requires judicial involvement in public law litigation."'
22" See id. at 48 k .
" I Id. at 472-73.
' Id. at 506.
'23 Id. at 509.
224 Id. at 507-08. According to Eisenberg and Yeazell, -judicial enforcement of individual rights
often necessarily involves the reallocation of funds." Id. at 507.
225 Id. at 510, 516.
226 Chayes, 1976, supra note 7, at 1282.
22? See Chayes, 1982, supra note 7, at 60.
228 Id.
228
 Id.
" See id.
221 Johnson, supra note 10, at 271.
232 Id. at 272.
"3 Id.
231 Id. at 279.
'' Id. at 271.
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in summary, the debate over the validity of public law litigation involves two distinct
and conflicting views on the role of the federal judiciary. Those in opposition to t his
litigation view the judicial role to be a limited one in a democratic form of government .""
The advocates of public law litigation, however, maintain that the role of the judiciary is
an active one of overseeing the other branches of government. 2 "7 In the Supreme Court's
recent decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyütts, 238 the Court stated its view on the proper role
of the judiciary.' As that decision makes clear, a majority of the Court agrees with the
critics of public law litigation and has moved towards limiting the availability of injunctive
relief in such suits.'"' In the following parts of this note, the Lyons decision and its impact
will be considered at length.
111. Cm' of Los ANGELES v. LYONS
This part of the note examines the Supreme Court's opinion in Lyons and will be
divided into two sections. One section describes the lower court opinions and the frame-
work in which the case itrose.."' The second section then considers the Supreme Court's
majority and dissenting opinions.
A. The Lower Courts
On February 7, 1977, Adolf Lyons filed a claim under the Civil Rights Act against the
City of Los Angeles in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, alleging police misconduct that violated Lyons' constitutional rights.' Lyons
alleged that on October 6, 1976, four Los Angeles police officers stopped his car for :1
vehicle code violation because one of the vehicle's taillights was not operating, 243 Accord-
ing to Lyons, the police officers, without any provocation or reason to fear their safety,
seized him and applied a "chokehold" that rendered hint unconscious and injured his
lary , x.244 Lyons further asserted that the routine use of such chokeholds was authorized
See, e.g., Frog, .supra note 9, at 735; Nlishkin, supra note 7, at 975-76.
237 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 10, at 271; Chayes, 1982, supra note 7, at 60.
"" 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983).
2" Id. at 1670-71.
24"
 See infra notes 366-95 and accompanying text.
241
 Two court of appeals opinions were written in the Lyons case. Lyons v. City of Los Angeles,
615 F.2d 1243, 1244 (9th Cir. I980) and Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1981).
No district court opinions were written. See 615 F.2d at 1246.
"2
 103 S. Ct. at 1663.
243 Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 616 F.2d 1243, 1244 (9th Cir. 1980).
'44
	S. Ct. at 1663. The Supreme Court later described the allegedly unconstitutional
"chokehold" in a footnote. Id. at 1663 n.l. The Court stated:
The police control procedures at issue in this case are referred to as "control
holds," "chokeholds," "strangleholds," and "neck restraints." All these terms refer to
two basic control procedures: the "carotid" hold and the "bar arm" hold. In the
"carotid" hold, an officer positioned behind a subject places one arm around the
subject's neck and holds the wrist of that arm with his other hand. The officer, by using
his lower forearm and bleep muscle, applies pressure concentrating on the carotid
arteries located on the sides of the subject's neck. The "carotid" hold is capable of
rendering the subject unconscious by diminishing the flow of oxygenated blood to the
brain. The "bar arm" hold, which is administered similarly, applies pressure at the front
of the subject's neck. "Bar arm" pressure causes pain, reduces the flow of oxygen to the
lungs, and may render the subject unconscious.
Id.
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under a city police department policy "even in non-life-threatening situations," 245 and that
numerous other citizens of Los Angeles had also been injured by this activity." 46 Finally,
Lyons claimed that he feared any future contact with the police would result in his being
choked again." 47 Lyons' complaint sought monetary damages under section 1983' 4" and
an injunction restraining the city from authorizing the use of chokeholds in non-life-
threatening situations.'-' 49 After the district court granted the city's motion for partial
summary judgment on the claim for injunctive relief, Lyons appealed the ruling to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.'"
The court of appeals began its analysis by considering whether the plaintiff had
standing to seek an injunction."5 i Because the district court did not issue any findings of
fact or conclusions of law with its judgment, the court of appeals assumed that the
district court's ruling was based on the arguments made by the city in its motion for partial
summary judgment."' According to the court, the city relied on the holdings of O'Shea
and Rizzo that past exposure to illegal activity does not by itself present a case or
controversy in regard to injunctive relief.'"
The court of appeals, however, distinguished O'Shea and Rizzo, and reversed the
district court."' First, the court reasoned that the thrêat of future injury to Lyons and to
other citizens of the Los Angeles area was much more immediate than the threat of future
injury which was faced by the plaintiffs in O'Shea and Rizzo . 255 O'Shea had involved a claim
of racial discrimination brought against local court officials.'" The court of appeals
explained that the threat of injury in O'Shea was too speculative because t he only way the
plaintiffs in that case could have been affected by the alleged illegal practice was to violate
the law, become arrested, and subsequently be tried and held by the court officials."' In
Rizzo, a suit was brought against city officials for alleged police abuses.'" According to the
'" Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243, 1244 (9th Cir. 1980).
245 Id.
247 103 S. Ct. at 1663.
"A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The plaintiff alleged "the strangleholds violated the
first amendment (prior restraint on speech), the fourth amendment (unreasonable seizure of the
person), the eighth amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), and the fourteenth amendment
(due process)." Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243, 1244 (9th Cir. 1980). The plaintiff also
invoked 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. Id.
79 id. at 1244. The complaint contained seven counts. Counts one through four sought money
damages; count five sought an injunction; count six sought declaratory relief; and count seven
concerned a declaratory judgement concerning a local ordinance and an alleged conflict of interest
within the city attorney's office. Id. at 1244-45 (Count seven was dismissed by the Circuit Court on
grounds of moonless, and was never raised again in subsequent proceedings. Id. at 1245).
'" Id. The district court issued no opinion with its riding. Id. at. 1246.
251 Id. It is unclear from the opinion why the Court of Appeals considered whether the plaintiff
had standing on counts five and six in light of the fact that the plaintiff apparently had standing due
to his damages claim. There is no indication that the damages.claim had yet been "severed" from the
claim for equitable relief, as apparently had occurred in the proceedings on remand to the District
Court. See 103 S. Ct. 1667 n.6.
252 Lyo - -ns v. City of Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243, 1246 (1980).
"3 Id. See supra notes 69-95 and accompanying text for discussion of the O'Shea and Rizzo
opinions.
2" Id. at 1250.
"' Id. at 1246. See supra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
2" O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 490 (1974). See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243, 1246 (1980).
258 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366 (1976). See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
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court of appeals, the threat of future injury in Rizzo was "even more speculative" since it
depended upon what a minority of unnamed police officers might do to the plaintiffs
because of the officers' misunderstanding of police disciplinary procedures.''" The court
of appeals asserted that the odds of having additional chokeholds applied by the Los
Angeles police were much greater than the odds of having the encounter in O'Shea or the
encounter in Rizzo 21" and held, therefore, that Lyons' complaint met the case or con-
troversy requirements.'" The court of appeals also distinguished Lyons from O'Shea and
Rizzo on "broader and more significant grounds." 2 a'-- First, the court reasoned that the
Supreme Court had denied standing in O'Shea and Rizzo because those cases involved
requests for "massive structural relief" against stare institutions.'" According to the court
of appeals, those requests constituted intrusions into state matters that violated the
doctrine of federalism, and gave rise to stricter standing requirements.'" Second, the
court of appeals reasoned that because the plaintiff in the case before it did not seek such
structural relief,'" the stricter standing requirements of O'Shea and Rizzo were inapplica-
ble.'66 According to the court., the plaintiff in Lyon.c did not seek "to supervise the
functioning of the police department," but instead, sought to enjoin an established,
sanctioned police practice that allegedly violated constitutional rights.'"'
The city's initial petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied.""
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the district court where the district court consid-
ered Lyons' application for a preliminary injunction."" On remand, the district court.
severed Lyons' claim for damages from his claim for injunctive relief."' From this point in
the proceedings, Lyons pressed only his injunctive claim." After considering the merits
-25' Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 615 F.2(1 1243, 1246 (1980).
2" Id. at 1246-47.
111i 
Id.
202 Id. at 1247.
"3 Id.
2114 See id.
265 Id.
20" see id .
207 Id .
"1fl City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 449 U.S. 934 (1980) (Justice White dissented, joined by Justices
Powell and Rehnquist).
The dissent, written by Justice White, mated: "O'Shea arid Rizzo made clear that the federal courts
are not the forum in which dissatisfied citizens may air their disagreements with government policy.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. 111.
-
Id. at 936.
Justice White later concluded: "We could not conclude that respondent has standing to press his
claims for equitable relief without re-examining our holdings iu O'Shea and Rizzo on the limits of the
case-or-controversy requirement of Art. III. - Id. at 937.
In this opinion, Justice White did not indicate why the respondent's standing to seek an
injunction was considered without reference to the damages claim. lie did state, however, that "j1Jhe
only issue before this Court is whether in seeking injunctive and declaratory relief respondent has
stated a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the federal court s."Irl. at 935. No reference was
made to whether or not the damages claim had yet been "severed." See 103 S. Ct. at 1667 n.6.
The Court of AppealS opinion failed to give an adequate explanation why only standing to seek
an injunction was considered. No explanation for this procedural point is offered until Justice
White's footnote in the final Lyons decision. 103 S. Ct. at 1667 n.6. See infra notes 290-92 and
accompanying text.
269 103 S. Cr. at 1664.
' 7° See id. at 1667 n.6.
" 1
 103 S. Ct. at 1664.
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of the plaintiff's claim, the district court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the
use of chokeholds in situations where police officers were not threatened by death or
serious bodily injury."' The preliminary injunction also included an order that required
the development of an improved training program, the filing of regular reports and the
keeping of records of all incidents where chokeholds were applied."' Subsequently, the
case was appealed for the second time to the Ninth Circuit, this time by the City of Los
Angeles.'" In a very brief opinion, the court of appeals considered whether the district
court had abused its discretion in issuing the injunction.'" Finding that the district court
had not abused its discretion, the court of appeals affirmed the injunctive order, - ' The
City of Los Angeles then filed a second petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which the Court granted."'
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in Lyons had failed to
meet the case or controversy requirements.'" The majority opinion, written by Justice
White, began by describing the facts and procedural history of Lyons ."" justice White
pointed out that the Conn .( was "principally concerned" with Lyons' claim for an injunc-
tion,'" and stressed that on remand Lyons had pressed only his claim fin. injunctive
Then Justice White commenced the Court's analysis by briefly considering the
plaintiff's request to vacate the preliminary injunctive order on the grounds that the case
was moot clue to a temporary moratorium that had been placed on the use of chokeholds
by the city.'8 ' After rejecting the plaintiff's request on the ground that the temporary
moratorium could be lifted at any time,'" the Court turned to a consideration of whether
the plaintiff had standing to bring an injunctive claim under the Article 111 case or
controversy requirements.'"
272 id .
273 Id .
'2" Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1981).
27i Id. at 418.
2" Id.
277
 455 U.S. 937 (1982). Prior to the grant of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist wrote a short opinion
granting the City's application to stay the district court's injunction. 453 U.S. 1308 (1981). In one
portion of that opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated in pan: "On this [standing] issue, I think there is
enough difference in the approach of the Court of Appeals in this case and the approach of this
Court in O'Shea v. Liteloon . . . and Rizzo u. Goode . . . to offer a pplicants  a reasonable chance of success
on the merits .should the Court grant certiorari. - Id. at 1311 (citations omitted).
Justice Rehnquist also stated: "1 conclude that there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of
the basic holding of the Court of Appeals with respect to standing on the part of the respondent,
together with sufficient equities in favor of the city, to warrant a stay....'' Id. at 1312.
'" 103 S. Ct. at 1667.
103 S. Ct. at 1663 (justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor,
Powell and Rehnquist). Justice White was also the author of the opinion in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
988 (1974), upon which the Lyman decision relied. .
"0 103 S. Ct. at 1663.
" 1
 Id. at 1664.
2 '12 /4. Lyons had asserted that an injunction was no longer necessary in light of the moratorium.
Id. Apparently, Lyons desired to have the preliminary injunction vacated in order to preserve the
right to an injunction by avoiding a possible unfavorable Supreme Court decision. See 449 U.S. 934
(1980) (opinion written by Justice White dissenting front denial of certiorari),
"" 103 S. Ct. at 1664.
284 Id. at 1665.
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The Court began its Article 111 analysis by reciting the well-settled principle that in
order to meet the case or controversy requirements, a plaintiff "must demonstrate a
`personal stake in the outcome.' '' S5
 According to the Court, a showing of abstract injury
would not he enough. As Justice White reasoned, a plaintiff must be able to show that
he " 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' " result-
ing from the challenged conduct.' The Court then reiterated the principle articulated in
O'Shea and Rizzo that past exposure to illegal activity does not establish a case or con-
troversy entitling the plaintiff to injunctive relief unless accompanied by continuing,
adverse effects.'" According to the Court, no extension of O'Shea and Rizzo was necessary
to hold that the plaintiff in the matter before it had failed to allege a case or controversy
that would justify injunctive relief.'" To support this conclusion, the Court indicated in
an accompanying footnote that the damages claim in Lyons had been severed from the
claim for injunctive relief.'!" Asa result of the severance, the Court maintained, the Lyons
case came to the Court "on all fours with O'Shea and should be judged as such." 191 The
Court then indicated in its opinion that although Lyons "presumably" would be afforded
standing to bring a claim for damages because he had been choked, such an occurrence
did not establish a threat of future injury. 29 ' According to the Court, the allegations were
therefore insufficient under O'Shea and Rizzo to provide a federal court with jurisdiction
to entertain the injunctive claim.' 93
 The Court then proceeded to reject. the court of
appeals reasons for distinguishing O'Shea and Rizzo.'"
The Court first characterized as "untenable" the court of appeals' assertion that
Lyons was more immediately threatened with future injury than the plaintiffs in O'Shea
and Rizzo had been. 295
 According to the Supreme Court, it was "no more than conjecture"
that the police would apply a chokehold in every traffic stop or encounter with citizens,
and "no more than speculation" that Lyons would become involved in another incident
where he would "provoke the use of a chokehold." 296
 In the Supreme Court's view, the
28' Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
286 Id ,
"7 Id. The Court stated:
Abstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he "has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury" as the result of the challenged
official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both "real and immediate,"
not "conjectural" or "hypothetical."
Id. (citations omitted).
2" Id. The Court also quoted from O'Shea's observation that " 'case or controversy consid-
erations obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for
equitable relief.' " Id. at 1666 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974)).
"9 Id. at 1667.
290 Id. at 1667 n.6.
' 4 Id. Footnote 6, in full, stated:
The City states in its brief that on remand from the Court of Appeals' first
judgement "the parties agreed and advised the district court that the respondent's
damages claim could be severed from his effort to obtain equitable relief," Brief for
Petitioner 8 n.7. Respondent does not suggest otherwise. This case, therefore, as it
came to us, is on all fours with O'Shea and should be judged as such.
Id.
292
 Id. at 1667.
2" Id. at 1668.
'" Id.
"5 Id.
2" Id.
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claim of possible future injury in Lyons was no less speculative than the claims at issue in
O'Shea and Rizzo.'" The majority opinion then criticized the court of appeals' reasoning
that Lyons, unlike O'Shea and Rizzo, did not involve a request for "massive structural
relief.'" The Court explained that for purposes of Article III, it did not matter that the
relief requested was not structural, the decisive factor was a lack of realistic threat of
future injury.'" According to the Supreme Court, the court of appeals failed to give
sufficient weight to O'Shea and Rizzo when it erroneously reversed the district court.'"
After concluding that the plaintiff had failed to meet the case or controversy re-
quirement, the Supreme Court asserted that even if' it could he assumed that Lyons'
"pending damages suit" afforded hint standing to seek an injunction, the plaintiff still
could not obtain an injunction because he failed to meet the prerequisites for injunctive
relief? The Court maintained that one of the prerequisites for obtaining equitable relief
is that the party make a showing that he will suffer irreparable injury if such relief is
denied."' In the Court's view, this requirement could not be met where the plaintiff could
not show a real and immediate threat of future injury. 303
 Because the Court had already
determined that the plaintiffs claim was too speculative, it ruled that Lyons failed to meet
the threshold requirement of equitable relief — "a 'likelihood of substantial and immedi-
ate irreparable injury.' "3" In addition, the Court stated that Lyons failed to satisfy the
second requirement for obtaining equitable relief, namely, demonstrating that no ade-
quate remedy at law was available." 5 Lyons had such an adequate remedy, according to
the Court, because he could still challenge the legality of the city's actions in his suit for
damages.'"
After determining that Lyons had failed to meet the basic prerequisites of' equitable
relief, the Court, citing three significant standing cases," 17 further asserted that Lyons was
no more entitled to injunctive relief than any other Los Angeles citizen?' According to
the majority, a federal court may not. hear claims brought by citizens who merely assert
that law enforcement officers are acting unconstitutionally 309 Such "undifferentiated
claims," the Court stated, should be brought to the attention of local authorities through
the democratic process. 31 ' A federal court, the majority explained, is not the proper
'97 Id.
29' Id.
299 Id, at 1669. The Court also rejected the lower court's application of the "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review" rule, stating: "The rule that a claim does not become moot where it is
capable of repetition, yet evades review, is likewise inapposite. Lyons' claim that lie was illegally
strangled remains to be litigated in his suit for damages; in no sense does that claim 'evade . review. -
Id,
300 id .
3" Id. at 1670. Justice Marshall, in dissent, asserted that the Court was writing an advisory
opinion in this portion of the opinion. /d. at 1682 (Marshall, j., dissenting).
3" Id. at 1670.
"3 Id,
304 id .
3°5 Id.
306 ,rd .
3"7 Id. The cases cited were: Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (see supra notes 112-32 and
accompanying text); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (see supra notes
96-110 and accompanying text); and United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (see supra
notes 96 - 110) (all three cases denied standing to the plaintiffs).
Id. at 1670.
3°9 Id. at 1671.
310 Id. at 1670. The Court observed in a footnote that civic complaints and debate in the city had
already resulted in a self-imposed moratorium on the use of chokeholds. Id. at 1670 n.10.
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forum in which to press such claims unless the standing and remedial requirements have
been met."" Invoking the federalism considerations that persuaded the Court to restrain
federal equitable power in Younger ,"r 2
 the Court asserted that "recognition of the need for
a proper balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of
injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the states' criminal
laws. . . According to the Supreme Court, the court of appeals failed to apply these
principles when it erroneously affirmed the district court order.'" Finally, the Court
observed That state courts are not constrained by the same requirements for standing and
equitable relief as federal courts."' State courts, the Supreme Court concluded, may
oversee the conduct of law enforcement officials on a continuous basis if the individual
states so permit; however, such judicial supervision is not the proper role of a federal
court."'"
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in Lvons, joined by three other members
of the Court, that maintained that Lyons' damages claim plainly gave hint standing."'
The dissent asserted that the majority used an "unprecedented and unwarranted ap-
proach -
 that fragmented the standing inquiry into a requirement that the plaintiff show
standing for each form of relief sought."" According to the dissent, the decision departed
significantly from the Court's traditional standing analysis, and misapplied the principles
of O'Shea and Rizzo."'" The cases on which the majority relied, the dissent observed, did
not involve damages claims.'"" According to the dissent, t he plaintiffs in O'Shea and Rizzo
relied solely upon their allegations of future injury because they had sought only equita-
ble relief.""' Deeming the severability of the damages claim to be "irrelevant,''' the
dissent argued that the plaintiff's claim for damages in Lyons enabled him to meet the
standing requirements on the basis of his past injury.'" The majority's decision, according
to the dissent, "t tin[ed] . well accepted [standing) principles on their heads  ""24
 The
dissent observed that the only relevancy that remedy has had to the standing inquiry in
the past has been the limited question of whether some form of relief is possible."'" The
dissent argued that the majority in Lyons had drastically altered that inquiry"" by requir-
ing a separate standing inquiry for each form of relief requested."'"
The dissent then observed that considerations of remedy have traditionally occurred
"" Id. at 1670.
'12 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (see supra notes 139-47 and accompanying
text).
313 103 S. Ct. at 1670.
314
 Id. at 1670-71.
3 " Id. at 1671.
316 Id .
'17 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan, Stevens and
Blackmun).
2" Id. at 1676.
:119 Id .
3" Id.
321 See id,
Id. at 1678 ri.18. Footnote 18 appears to be the only place in the dissent where Justice
Marshall addressed the significance of the severability of' the damages claim.
13
 Id. at 1677 - 78.
"" Id, at 1680.
325.
2" See id.
327 Id.
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at the end of the trial on the merits."' According to the dissent, the new fragmented
standing inquiry employed by the majority moved these considerations to a threshold
determination on the pleadings. 3" 9 There are dangers involved in a doctrine that permits
foreclosure of a remedy by ruling on the pleadings, the dissent asserted, because it is very
difficult for courts to determine with any degree of certainty at that stage of the lawsuit
that equitable relief is appropriate."° The Lyons decision, the dissent concluded, was
"wholly inconsistent" with both well established principles of standing and well accepted
conceptions of the remedial powers of federal courts."'
The dissent next criticized the majority's application of the Younger principles of
federalism."' According to the dissent, the application in this case of comity and
federalism to restrain a federal court from enjoining a police department was not
proper.' The dissent maintained that the federalism restraints on federal equitable
power should only he applied in cases involving federal court interference with state court
criminal proceedings.'" In the dissent's view, the preliminary injunctions should have
been analyzed under traditional equitable principles rather than the stricter standard of
Younger."' If the majority had analyzed the district court grant of an injunction under
3" Id. The dissent stated:
The Court's fragmentation of the standing inquiry is also inconsistent with the way
the federal courts have treated remedial issues since the merger of law and equity, The
federal practice has been to reserve consideration of the appropriate relief until after a
determination of the merits, not to foreclose certain forms of' relief by a ruling on the
pleadings. The prayer for relief is not part of the plaintiff's cause of action....
Id. The dissent also indicated that Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stales that a
party does not have to demand a specific form of relief in order to be entitled to it, The dissent
stated: "The question whether a plaintiff has stated a claim turns not on 'whether [he] has asked for
the proper remedy, but whether he is entitled to any remedy.'"Id. (quoting WRIGHT & M 11.1,1;11, supra
note 33, § 1664) (emphasis in original),
529 id
no id .
:13i id.
"1 '2 Id. at 1682.
333 id.
n4 Id
Id. The distinction between "general equitable principles" and "the more to ringent standards
of Younger" t urns on whether or not federalism concerns are present. See WRIGHT & MILLER, ,supra
note 33, § 2942 at 378.
When a plaintiff's request for an injunction is not against a branch of local or slate government,
federalism concerns are not present. In that case, a district court is given broad discretion to
determine whether a preliminary injunction should he issued by weighing four factors. According to
one authority those lour factors are:
(1) the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff ifthe injunction is
not granted:
(2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunc-
tion would inflict on defendant;
(3) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and
(4) the public intereSt.
Id. at § 2948, 430-31. Once the district court grants the injunction in the typical case, "It Pie scope of
review is limited to determining whether the lower court violated sonic principle of equity Or abused
its discretion under Rule 65." Id. at § 2962, 633.
The standard in Younger is a higher one, in which "considerations favoring restraint become .
important." Id. at § 2942, 378. In applying the Younger standard "even irreparable injury is in-
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those general principles, according to the dissent, the preliminary injunction could riot
have been set aside."
V. THE IMPACT  OF LYONS
A. The New Standing Inquiry
The most significant doctrinal aspect of the Lyons decision is the manner in which the
Court has apparently altered the traditional standing inquiry. Justice Marshall in dissent
asserted that the majority changed the law of standing by applying a fragmented standing
inquiry which required the plaintiff to meet standing requirements for each claim of
relief sought."' Assuming that Justice Marshall is correct,"" (hen a major doctrinal shift
has taken place in the law of standing. First., the new inquiry has the effect of con-
stitut ionalifing the law of injunctions.' This result means that the federal courts are now
required to consider the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief at
the threshold of the suit, as a mandate of Article I II."4" Prior to Lyons, it was within the
discretion of the trial court to issue a preliminary or permanent injunction."'" The trial
court could balance the interests of both parties to an action, consider the interest of the
public at large, and issue an injunction if the court deemed such a measure to he
appropriate.'i4° In fact, the decision to issue a preliminary injunction could he overturned
by an appeals court only if it was found that the trial court abused its discretion. 34 ' A fter
Lyons, however, the discretionary decision is taken out of the hands of the trial court and
turned into a question of constitutional law to be determined at the beginning of the
suit .:144
sufficient unless it is 'both great and immediate'." Younger v. Harris, 901 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). In other
words, an injunction will not he issued under the Younger standard "except under extraordinary
circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate." N. at 45 (quoting
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926)).
According to the dissent in Lyons, the appropriate standard for determining whether to uphold
the preliminary injunction was to inquire whether the lower court abused its discretion. 103 S. Ct. at
1682-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
lower court to have concluded on the basis of general equitable principles and the preliminary facts
before it, that Lyons may have been at risk of future injury. In addition, the dissent indicated that
under the traditional standard, the lower court should have been at liberty to consider the risk to the
public in its determination that preliminary injunctive relief was appropriate. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
. "" Id. See supra note '335.
"7 103 S. Ct. at 1676 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"" A remote possibility exists that the Supreme Court did not fragment the standing inquiry in
Lyons. The Court made reference to the fact that the damages claim had been severed from the claim
for injunctive relief and, therefore, was not before the Court. 103 S. Ct. at 1667 ri.6. See Gonzales v.
City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 481 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that in Lyons I he "injunctive claim, standing
alone, did not present a case or controversy"). But see infra notes 357-65 and accompanying text.
See Fallon, supra note 18, at 10
- 11; Glekel, Constitutionalizing Law of Injunctions, 189 N.Y.L.J.
1, 32 (May 25, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Glekell; Standing to Seek Equitable Relief, supra note IS, at
219.
"° See 103 S. Ct. at 1665. See also supra note 28 and cases cited therein.
"' See supra notes 33-34.
"' See Wicwin. Se MILLER, supra note 33, § 2992.
'1 See 103 S. Ct. at 1682-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"4 See id. at 1665. See also Fallon, supra note 18, at 43.
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In addition to constitutionalizing the law of injunctions, the new standing inquiry
changes the traditional standing analysis by focusing on the claims of relief' the plaintiff
alleges."" This change is a significant shift because in past Supreme Court cases, the focus
of the standing inquiry has been on the party seeking to have his complaint heard befOre a
federal court."'" In other words, once a plaintiff met the personal stake and injury
requirement of Article III, the plaintiff was deemed to have alleged a case or controversy
for the purposes of having his claims considered by a federal court."' The fragmented
standing inquiry, however, forces a plaintiff to allege a case or controversy for each claim
of relief sought."8 In other words, ila plaintiff has brought hot h a claim for damages and
a claim for equitable relief, he would have to allege two cases or controversies: one case or
controversy for the damages claim and a second case or controversy for the equitable
claim.'" Such an analysis is, indeed, "wholly inconsistent" with precedent.' Justice
Marshall's dissent is correct in asserting that "Nile Court's decision turns . . . well accepted
[standing] principles on their heads. Never before has the Court required a
plaintiff to make such a dual showing of it case or controversy.
Although the Court has stated in previous cases that the question of standing "often
turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted,' Justice Marshall was correct in
observing in his Lyons dissent that the focus on the claim has had only limited relevance to
the standing inquiry. 353 In regard to the case or controversy requirement, focus on the
substantive claims has been made only to determine whether the plaintiff is an "appropri-
ate party to invoke federal judicial power,"" ti 4 in other words, whether some form of relief
3"s
	
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (stating: -The fundamental aspect of standing
is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues
he wishes to have adjudicated") with Allen v. Wright, 104 S. CI. 3315, 3325 (1984) (stating: "the
standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain
whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims").
3" See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83. 99 (1968).
But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490. 515-16 (1975).
The Court in Warth v. Seldin may have established a precedent for fragmenting the standing
inquiry. In determining that one of the plaintiff-associations did not have standing, the Court first
considered whether the damages claim provided a basis for standing. Id. at 515. After concluding
that the association's allegation of past injury was insufficient to confer standing, id. at 515 - 16, the
Court considered whether the claim for equitable relief provided a basis for standing. Id, at 516. The
Court then concluded that the complaint did not show a "sufficient immediacy and reality" of injury
to meet the case or controversy requirements. Id. It is true that the Court considered each claim
separately to determine if there was a basis for standing, but the Court did not actually establish the
principle that a plaintiff must meet the standing requirements for both claims. The Court merely
concluded that neither of the claims could serve as a basis for the particular plaintiff's standing. See
also Fallon, wpm, note 18, at 35-39.
.1 " The traditional inquiry has been whether the plaintiff has a sufficient "personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See supra note 30. See also 103
S. Ct. at 1679 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
"' See supra note 28 and cases cited therein.
3"9 See, e.g., Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1446-47 (5th Cir. 1984); Twytnan v. Rockville
Housing Authority, 99 F.R.D, 314, 319 (D.Md. 1983); Trotter v. Klincar, 566 F. Supp. 1059, 1063
(N.D.11I. 1983).
'5° 103 S. Ct. at 1680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' Id.
352
 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). See supra note 346.
"'3
 103 S. Ct. at 1680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1" United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174 (1974) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
102 (1968)).
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is available to the plaintiff' that would provide him with a personal stake in the outcome. 355
In regard to the prudential limitations of standing, the focus on the claim has been related
to inquiring whether the relevant constitutional or statutory provision grants the plaintiff
a right to seek judicial relief.'" If the Lyons Court altered the standing inquiry as the
dissent has asserted, the Court has failed to provide a rationale that is soundly based on
precedent, and has extended the principles of O'Shea and Rizzo far beyond their holdings.
The Lyons decision, on the other hand, can be viewed consistently with precedent.
Justice White expressly stated in the Lyons opinion that the Court was not extending Rizzo
and O'Shea by its holding,"" In making this assertion, Justice White explained that as a
result of the severance of the damages claim, the case came to the Court "on all fours with
O'Shea ."''" The case of O'Shea, the reader may recall, involved only a claim for injunctive
relief.;''" It therefore follows that if Lyons was "on all fours with O'Shea - after the damages
claim had been severed, the Court, therefore, may have considered the Lyons case to he an
independent suit seeking only injunctive relief."' The damages claim may have consti-
tuted a separate suit which was considered completely apart from the suit for injunctive
relief. Under this assumption, the Court would not have been establishing a fragmented
standing inquiry,' but merely reaffirming the rule of law from O'Shea that a person who
seeks only injunctive relief does not meet the case or controversy requirement unless he
can show a likelihood of future injury,' This interpretation loses its force, however,
when one considers the oddity of having the case turn on the mere fact that the damages
claim had been voluntarily severed during the lower court proceedings.' In addition, if
the Court intended such an approach, the majority opinion would most likely have
refuted justice Marshall's criticism that the Court was fragmenting the standing in-
quiry." 14
 One can safely assume, therefore, that the Court has created a new standing
"r' See supra note 30.
1" See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 488, 5(10 (1975).
3." 103 S. Ct. at 1680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35" Id. at 1667 n.6. See supra note 338.
See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974). See Mira notes 69-80 and accompanying
text.
The language used by the Court in the opinion may he interpreted to suggest that the
majority viewed the damages claim as an independent suit. At three places in the opinion the Court
referred to the damages claim as a separate suit.
The Court stated: "Lyons fairs no better if it be assumed that his pending damages suit affords him
Article 111 standing... ." Id. at 1670 (emphasis added).
The Court also stated: "The legality of the violence to which Lyons claims he was once subjected
is at issue in his suit for damages and can be determined there." Id. (emphasis added).
In addition, the Court stated: "Lyons' claim that he was illegally strangled remains to be litigated
in his suit for damages 
	 " Id. at 1669 (emphasis added).
It is also worth noting that the Court stated, in reference to the case as a whole, that Lyons had
failed "to establish an actual controversy in this case. . . ." Id. at 1667 (emphasis added). If the Court had
required the plaintiff to meet the standing requirements for each claim, it is unclear why the Court
did not say "actual controversy as to this claim" rather than "in this case." Id.
See also Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2(1 468, 481 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that the injunctive
claim in Lyons, "standing alone," did not meet the case or controversy requirement) (the Ninth
Circuit, however, applied a fragmented standing inquiry to the claims in the case before it).
S"' But see 103 S. Ct. at 1678 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3"2
	 v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495.96 (1974).
"' See 103 S. Ct. at 1667 n.6.
3"4 Id. at 1676 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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inquiry. In fact, lower federal courts have already applied the principles of Lyons as a
fragmented standing inquiry.'"
B. The Demise of Public Law Litigation
The Lyons decision has a two-fold effect on public law litigation. First, the con-
utionalization of the prerequisites to injunctive relief makes it virtually impossible fOr a
plaintiff to enjoin government policy or practices unless the plaintiff can show a likeli-
hood of future injury at the pleadings stage of the law suit."" This requirement must he
met even if" the plaintiff' has already been injured by such government policy or prac-
tices.' Second, dicta in the Lyons decision regarding the constraints of Younger federalism
suggests a further obstacle for plaintiffs who seek to enjoin government."" Even if a
plaintiff can make an adequate showing of future injury and consequently meets the strict
standing requirements, the Lyons decision indicates that the doctrine of federalism "coun-
sels restraint" in the issuance of an injunction against a branch of state government?"'
This section of the note discusses two post-Lyons decisions that have dismissed claims for
injunctive relief' in public law litigation cases on the basis of these principles and explains
why Lyons may halt the proliferation of such litigation.
I. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief
Since Lyons was decided, there have been numerous federal court decisions relying
on the restrictive standing principles of Lyons to deny injunctive relief against local
governments.' Some of these decisions have denied such relief despite gross violations
of plaintiffs' constitutional rights by government."' One of' t.hese cases, Smith v. Montgom-
ery County, Maryland , 3" is particularly illustrative of the serious effect that Lyons has had on
public law litigation.
In Smith, a district court denied injunctive and declaratory relief to a woman who had
been subjected to an unconstitutional strip search." Smith involved a plaintiff by the
name of Vivian Smith who had been arrested for contempt of court for failure to appear
in court in connection with a child support action."" Upon arriving at the detention
center, Ms. Smith was subjected to a complete strip search and was forced to squat as a
correctional officer inspected her oral, vaginal and anal cavities."' The search was con-
ducted pursuant to a strip search policy that required the search of all detainees regard-
less of whether probable cause existed to conduct such a search." The indiscriminate
strip search policy was unconstitutional,"" according to the court, but the plaintiff did not
36° See supra note 28 and cases cited therein.
356
 See supra note 26 and cases cited therein.
3" See 103 S. Ct. at 1667.
' Id. at 1670 - 71.
3'9 Id. at 1670.
"° See supra note 28 and cases cited therein.
371 See supra note 26 and cases cited therein.
"72 573 F. Stipp. 604 (D.Md. 1983).
"" Id. at 608-09.
"" Id, at 606.
375 Id. at 606 -07.
376 Id. at 607.
377
 Id. at 611.
tiA
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have standing to request injunctive or declaratory relief because she could not allege a
likelihood that she would again he subjected to the strip search." As a result, the plaintiff
was left only with her damages claim, and the court was left powerless to enjoin the
County from continuing its unconstitutional search policy.
The Smith case into rates the effect that I be Lyons decision has on public law lit igat ion.
A plaintiff will not be able to obtain an injunction against a government policy, even
where such policy is hlatantly unconstitutional and could be repeated on other individ-
uals, unless the plaintiff can allege that she is likely to he personally injured in the future
as a result of that policy,"" Without such an allegation, a trial court is powerless 10 issue an
injunction.
2. The Constraints of Federalism
Even if a plaintiff is able to meet. the stringent standing requirements for obtaining art
injunction, the Lyons decision indicates that there is a further hurdle for the public law
litigation plaintiffi'm In Lyons, the Supreme Court stated that even "if it be assumed that
[the plaintiff's] pending damages suit afford[ed] him standing to seek an injunction as a
remedy," the plaintiff' still could not obtain the injunction on basic equitable grounds. ]"r
Citing Younger v. Harris, the Court indicated that a "recognition of the need for a proper
balance between slate and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunc-
tions. . :18s According to the Court, principles of comity and federalism restrain a
federal court from issuing injunctions against state law enforcement officials.' The Lyons
Court, in effect, reaffirmed the broad principle of Rizzo v. Goode that a federal court may
not interfere with the internal affairs of a state agency except in extraordinary circuits-
sta nces." 4
By reaffirming the broad principles of federalism arising out of Rizzo, tlic Lyons
decision not only establishes a strict standing analysis, but also stands as precedent for
federal court refusal m issue injunctive relief on grounds of federalism."' At least one
Id. at 608-09. The court was apparently uncomfOrtable with its decision not to enjoin the
unconstitutional strip search policy, because the court issued a warning to the defendant, stating:
"[A]lthough defendants are technically free to resume the strip search policy that was in effect prior
to the issuance of the preliminary injunction, to do so may ..subject them to both compensatory and
punitive damages. - Id. at fi09.
37' Id. at 608. In his Lyons dissent, Justice Marshall foresaw the effects of the minority opinion,
stating;
The Court's decision removes an entire class of constitutional violations from the
equitable powers of a federal court. It immunizes from prospective equitable relief any
policy that authorizes persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as long as no
individual can establish with substantial certainty I hal he will be injured, or injured
again, in the future.
103 S. Ct. at 1683 (Marshall. J., dissenting).
3" See I03-S. Ct. at 1670.
"I Id.
3142
MO hi .
334 See, e.g., Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1446-47 (5th Cir. 1984); Trotter v. Klincar, 566
F. Supp. 1059, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
The Supreme Court has indicated that federalism acts as a const mint in any situation where a
federal court considers issuing an injunction against a branch of state government. See Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976).
Prior to Lyons it was possible to argue that Rizzo was an aberrations, but the Lyons Court made
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circuit court has already used this principle of federalism to deny injunctive relief.' 8 "
Gonzales v. City of Peoria,' the Ninth Circuit denied injunctive relief on grounds of
federalism, despite a finding that the plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient likelihood of
future injury to meet the standing requirements."' Gonzales involved a suit brought by
eleven persons of Mexican descent who filed claims for injunctive and damages relief
against the City of Peoria, Arizona for an allegedly unconstitutional police department
policy that permitted the stopping of persons of Mexican descent for the purposes of
enforcing federal immigration laws. a" The Ninth Circuit found that some of the plaintiffs
were able to show a sufficient threat of future injury because they had alleged that the
policy was consistently applied to all citizens stopped for traffic violations.'" Accordingly,
the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to seek injunctive relief."'" The court relied
On Lyons, however, and denied injunctive relief on the grounds that "federal courts may
not intervene in state enforcement activities absent extraordinary circumstances... . "392
Gonzales demonstrates that Lyons affects public law litigation not only through its
restrictive standing requirements, but also in it.s reassertion of the federalism principles
arising out of Younger v. Harris,'" and Rizzo v. Goode.'" if this impact does not spell the
demise of public law litigation, it at least makes it so difficult for a public law litigation
plaintiff to obtain an injunction, that only in the most extreme cases will such litigation
successfully lead to an injunction against government. 395
C. The Applicability of Lyons In the Non-Public Law Litigation Context
As previously discussed, Lyons effectively limits public law litigation by requiring, as a
constitutional mandate of Article III, that a plaintiff show a likelihood of future injury in
clear that the federalism concerns that constrained the Court in Rizzo was a consideration in Lyons as
well. See 103 S. Ct. at 1670.
One might also argue that the Younger federalism that was applied in Rizzo and Lyons is a narrow
constraint because it has been applied only to restrain a federal court from issuing injunctions against
law enforcement authorities. See e.g. Wein berg,supra note 10, at 1220. But such a narrow view of the
constraints of federalism is not consistent with the broad concept as described in Younger and Rizzo. if
federalism is a consideration at all, it must be a consideration in all cases where a conflict arises
between federal and state authority.
The Supreme Court recently suggested that the federalism constraints of Rizzo would be
applicable in a situation that did not involve law enforcement authorities. See Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Haldeman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 910 n.13 (1984). Dicta in footnote 13 stated: "We do not
decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction under this reasoning to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, but we note that the scope of any relief would he constrained by
principles of comity and federalism... ." Id. (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976)).
386 See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 481 (9th Cir. 1983).
387 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983).
"8 Id. at 481.
389
	 at 472.
Id. at 481.
39i id .
59' Id.
3" 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
"" 423 U.S. 362 (1976). See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
"' Under the Lyons analysis, law enforcement authorities are, indeed, virtually immunized from
injunctive relief, see 103 S. Ct. at 1683 (Marshall, J., dissenting), because it will be only in rare
circumstances that a citizen will be able to allege that a law enforcement policy is likely to personally
injure him. And even if the citizen can make such a showing, a federal court may still be bound to
deny injunctive relief' on grounds of federalism.
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order to seek injunctive reliel." 96 The basis of this principle is the Supreme Court's
concern for the proper role of the federal courts in our democratic system of govern-
ment."97 As the Court stated in Lyons, it is not the role of a federal court "to use injunctions
to oversee the conduct of law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis." 398 The
Court has reiterated this principle in a recent standing decision, indicating that at the core
of the holding in Lyons "was the principle that la] federal court ... is not the proper
fitrum to press' general complaints about the way in which government goes about its
business."' According to the Court, this notion of he proper role of the federal courts is
grounded in the idea of separation of powers and the principle that the government is
granted wide latitude in the administration of its internal affairs.'" federalism restrains
the federal courts front interfering with state government in the same way the doctrine of
separation of powers constrains court action in the context of judicial interference with an
agency of the federal government."' The Court has stated that this notion of the proper
role of the federal judiciary is at the core of Article Ill and gives rise to the strict injury
requirement of the Lyons standing analysis.'"
If the strict Article Ill injury requirements formulated in Lyons arc founded in the
doctrine of separation of powers and the notion of the properly limited role of the federal
courts, the question arises as to the applicability of such requirements in cases where
separation of powers or federalism concerns arc not present."' In cases where an injured
plaintiff seeks an injunction against government, the Supreme Court's decision to require
3" 103 S. Ct. at 1665, See supra notes 285-3(14) and accompanying text.
'1 "7 See 103 S. Ct. at 1670.71; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 449 U.S. 934, 936 (1980) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ward) v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
"" 103 S. Ct. at 1665.
3" Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3330 (1984). While discussing the relevance of separation of
powers concerns to the Article Ill standing analysis, the Court stated:
The same concern for the proper role of the federal courts is reflected in cases like
O'Shea v. Littleton ... , Rizzo v. Goode . . . , and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.. . . . Animating
this Court's holdings was the principle that lid federal court ... is not the proper
forum to press" general complaints about the way in which government goes about its
business.
Id. (quoting Lyons, 103 S. Ct. at 1670) (citations omitted).
'1" Id.
40 ' See Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974). See also Allen v. Wright,
104 S. Ct. 3315, 3329-30 (1984) (discussing separation of powers, Lyons and Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362
(1976) and citing Rizzo to illustrate a basic principle of separation of powers doctrine).
Ai least one commentator has discussed at length the overlap of federalism and separation of
powers concerns. See Nagel, supra note 9.
4" See Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3330 (1984) (see supra note 399).
40 Justice Stevens has criticized the Court for basing its "redressability-
 requirement of Article
111 on separation of powers grounds. See Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3346 & n.10 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Stevens stated:
The danger of the Court's approach is illustrated by its failure to provide any
standards to guide courts in determining when it is appropriate to require a more
rigorous redressahility showing because of separation of powers concerns, or how
redressability can be demonstrated in a case raising separation of powers concerns, The
only guidance the Court offers is that separation of powers counsels against recognizing
standing... ,
Id. at 3346 11.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens' remarks may implicitly suggest that when separation of powers concerns are not
present, the standing requirement may riot be as strict.
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a showing of future injury is arguably justifiable as a mandate of Article Ill and the
separation of powers concerns at its core.'" Where an injured plaintiff seeks an injunction
against a private, non-governmental defendant, however, separation of powers or related
federalism concerns are not implicated.' In such a case, therefore, requiring an injured
plaintiff to meet standing requirements for each claim of relief sought is not justified on
separation of powers or federalism grounds. The question, then, is whether in private
litigation a plaintiff will he subjected to the strict fragmented standing inquiry of Lyons, or
whether such plaintiff will only be required to allege past injury to invoke the federal
court's jurisdiction over the injunctive claim.
The question whether Lyons is applicable in the private litigation context is an
important one. If the plaintiff in such cases does not have standing to bring an injunctive
claim at the threshold of the suit, the plaintiff will lose all opportunity to obtain equitable
relief under traditional principles of equity at the end of t he tria1. 406 Traditional principles
of equity require a likelihood of irreparable injury"' which is similar to the likelihood of
future injury that is required by Lyons ; 4"s hut, historically, a federal court does not
determine if irreparable harm is threatened until the end of the trial on the merits. 409 A
plaintiff who cannot allege a likelihood of future injury at the pleadings stage of the trial
may he able to make that showing by the end of the trial aher.all the evidence has been
presented. The fragmented standing inquiry of Lyons, however, would eliminate at the
threshold of the suit any equitable relief sought in the complaint, and presumably leave
the federal court powerless to consider any injunctive relief at a later stage."'
There has never been any doubt that the Article III case or controversy requirements
are applicable to all federal cases, private litigation as well as public law litigation . 4 "
Hence, it is possible that the Court intended the fragmented standing inquiry to apply to
all federal cases without regard to the nature of the particular suit. The Court has
indicated, however, that the principles underlying the Lyons decision are grounded in
separation of powers concerns. 41 ' if so, it may be unclear what the standing inquiry
should be when such concerns are not present. 4 I 3 As critical as some of the commentators
may be of the Supreme Court's approach to standing in the Lyons decision, 4 " the Court
404 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, i 76-79 (1974) (indicating that a plaintiff ought
to use the democratic process to voice his grievances with government policy); Schlesinger v.
Reservists to Stop (he War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974) (holding that a court may not allow- a plaintiff to
adjudicate a dispute with government policy without meeting the injury requirements because such a
case would "open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing 'government by injunction'").
That is, the federal court will not he violating either the doctrine of separation of powers or
the doctrine of federalism by recognizing standing. Separation of powers or federalism concerns may
still be present in another aspect of the case.
"" It can be presumed that if a court rules at the pleadings stage of the suit that (he plaintiff
does not have standing to bring an injunctive claim, that such plaimiff has lost his right to obtain such
relief. Otherwise, the standing issue would be rendered meaningless.
407 See supra note 34.
4" See 103 S. Ct. at 1666 (stating "that case or controversy considerations shade into those
determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief." Id. (quoting O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. at 499)). See also Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Cu. 3315, 3330 (1984).
103 S. Ct. at 1680 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'I' See supra note 26 and cases cited therein. See also supra note 406.
411 See supra note 38.
4i' See Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3330 (1984) (see supra note 399).
4 " See supra note 403.	 •
414 See Fallon, supra note 18; Glekel, supra note 339; Standing to Seek Equitable Relief, supra time
18.
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was on arguably sound constitutional grounds. 4" When a plaintiff seeks an injunction
against government, he is attempting to use the federal court as a means of changing
government policy:1 ' 6
 As the Court has indicated, making policy is not the proper role of a
federal court in a democratic system of government. 417
 In the private litigation context,
however, the Lyons approach loses its constitutional foundation because t.here is no
democratic alternative to the courts. It is, therefore, not justifiable on constitutional
grounds, nor reasonable as a matter of prudential concern to require a private litigation
plaintiff to meet a heightened standing requirement which supplants traditional princi-
ples of equitable relief. A governmental defendant may require deference in the name of
federalism or separation of powers before standing to seek an injunction can be conferred
on the plaintiff; 418
 however, a private defendant who has engaged in unlawful conduct
which has injured a plaintiff deserves no such deference. In such private cases, the federal
courts should allow traditional principles of equity to determine the appropriateness of
injunctive relief.'" The courts should not supplant the traditional principles of equity by
making a premature decision regarding equitable relief at the threshold of the suit. The
decision regarding injunctive relief in the private litigation context should remain as a
discretionary trial court decision made at the end of the trial.
Where a plaintiff seeks damages and an injunction in a private litigation case, he or
she must be required to meet the personal stake requirement of Article III by alleging
either a past injury, or the likelihood of future injury. 4 "0
 It would be inappropriate,
however, to require the private litigation plaintiff to meet the heightened requirements of
Lyons The Lyons approach may be justifiable in the context of public law litigation due
to the separation of powers or federalism concerns present in such cases, but such an
approach is entirely inappropriate and unjustifiable in a private suit brought against a
non-governmental defendant.
CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has embarked on a restrictive trend that
limits public law litigation in the federal courts. First, the Court has tightened the
requirements of standing in a way that limits the circumstances in which a plaintiff may
gain access to a federal court to air his grievances with government policy. Second, the
Court has tightened the requirements for injunctive relief by requiring federal courts to
refrain from issuing injunctions against state government except in extraordinary cir-
4" See supra note 404.
4 " See supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
417 See Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3330 (1984); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct.
1660, 1671 (1983); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
4" See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3330 (1984).
418
	
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, § 2942.
4" The Gourt has stated that "federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened OR actual injury
... before a federal court may assume jurisdiction." Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
(1973) (emphasis added). See also 103 S. Ct. at 1676 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
421 Although this note argues that a private litigation plaintiff should not be required to split his
claims for purposes of standing, it is not unlikely that. this result, in fact, is required by Lyons. As
indicated earlier, supra note 38, Article ill is applicable to all federal cases. Until the Court addresses
the issue, private litigation plaintiffs will need to be cognizant of the doctrinal effect of the Lyons
decision on the availability of injunctive relief.
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curnstances. Continuing with its restrictive trend, the Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons denied a plaintiff standing to seek an injunction against a local police department .
The Lyons Court held that even though the plaintiff had a pending damages claim that
appeared to meet the standing requirements, the plaintiff lacked standing to seek equita-
ble relief because of his failure to allege a sufficient threat of future injury. In addition,
the Court reaffirmed the principle that federalism concerns counsel restraint in the
issuance of injunctions against state government. As a result, the holdings of Lyons spell
the demise of public law litigation by making it extremely difficult to obtain an injunction
against the government.
The Lyons decision, however, has implications for cases outside of the context of
public law litigation. Since the Lyons decision was grounded in principles of Article III,
and Article I11 is applicable to all federal cases, the principles of Lyons are presumably
applicable in private litigation, as well as public law litigation. The Article III principles of
Lyons, however, are based on the notion of the proper role of the federal courts in our
democratic system of government, a notion founded in the doctrine of separation of
powers and related federalism principles. The restrictive standing inquiry, therefore,
which forces a plaintiff to meet standing requirements for each claim of relief sought,
should not be applicable in the context of private litigation where such separation of
powers and federalism concerns are not present.
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